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Economic sanctions have come under scrutiny in recent political scholarship. Sanction regimes 
are analyzed for effectiveness, intended targets, and societal impact. The theory of liberal 
internationalism greatly influences economic policy, foreign policy and diplomacy. Liberal 
internationalism can be summarized by one basic premise: states care what other states think. 
This shared notion has spawned a myriad of international organizations and is the lifeblood of 
the United Nations. The United Nations constructs norms and shared goals, presenting the 
consensus of a collective hegemony. Economic sanctions are a construct used to impose the 
general will. Little concession is made for countries that deviate from emerging norms. 
Historically, this aberration could be remedied by the ‘might makes right’ method of military 
force. To some degree, this military option is still in play, though it is widely discouraged by 
international norms. The preferred method of punishing rogue statecraft is economic sanctions, 
predicated on the assumption that global trade benefits all and is desired by even the most 
autocratic regimes. But economic punishment through sanctions can have similar effects to 
military action, both in the impact on civilian population and in long term financial standing of 
the targeted regime. Sanctions have devastating effects politically and economically, and thus 
seem inconsistent with a theory predicated on equality and fairness. The only mechanism 
protecting minority rights is the U.N. Security Council veto, which still requires the powerful to 
favor the marginalized over the groupthink of the international community. Sanctions stigmatize 
and demonize bad actors, and targeted states and individuals may find it takes decades to claw 
back to somewhat equal footing with the rest of the world community. The United Nations is 
defined by principles of liberal internationalism, and sanctions are employed to keep states in 
line with shared norms and goals. Despite their coercive nature, sanctions provide a useful tool 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Economic sanctions are an often implemented tool of international statecraft in which 
states may be punished for unwanted actions or influenced to reconsider current policy. 
Sanctions may be used to deter nuclear proliferation, discourage unfavorable human rights 
practices, or pressure regime change. They can be punitive or rehabilitative in nature. Sanctions 
can be unilateral or multilateral, comprehensive or targeted, span for decades or end once 
specific foreign policy goals are enacted. The United States engaged in coercive economic 
statecraft well before the advent of the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War brought new hope 
of what sort of world would emerge after the end of a global bipolar adversarial system. 
Unfortunately, that world has not fully materialized, as the United Nations, European Union and 
other states have adopted the practice of economic sanctions as a form of punishment to non-
conforming states. Economic sanctions play a vital role in establishing international norms and 
upholding a general consensus and therefore help preserve the post-World War II liberal 
international order. 
 For a more comprehensive look at the history of economic sanctions, the study by 
Hufbauer et al. (2011) is paramount. This seminal study from the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics refers historically back to ancient Greece in the use of economic 
statecraft. However, this study acknowledges that only after World War I were sanctions used 
instead of military action, as opposed to a part of a broader military engagement. For that reason, 
a more general focus on sanctions includes the twentieth century and beyond. Most authors 
admit the nature of sanctions changed drastically upon the conclusion of the Cold War. The 
world is connected through patterns of trade, communication and technology in an 
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unprecedented way. Adversarial patterns of behavior remain among competing dominant states, 
and among those with veto power in the United Nations. Despite evolving from a bipolar 
struggle, post-Cold War dynamics of economic coercion remain controversial. 
 Sanctions can be implemented with economic or political goals in mind. Hufbauer et al. 
(2011, 65-66) considered the following political variables: “presence of companion policies 
beyond routine diplomacy, extent of international cooperation on the sender, whether an 
international institution cooperated with the sender, presence of offsetting international 
assistance to the target, prior relations between sender and target, and nature of the target 
country’s regime (scaled autocracy to democracy) at the onset of sanctions.” Bryan Early (2015) 
identifies offsetting international assistance as ‘aid-based sanctions busting.’ Political motivation 
is often the impetus for the development of sanction regimes. Hufbauer et al. (2011) consider the 
following economic variables: size of sender and target countries, trade linkages, types of 
sanctions imposed (whether restricted trade, financial freeze or assets freeze are employed), 
economic health and political stability of target countries. They also examined the cost of 
sanctions to targets. Early (2015) considers these economic variables: ‘trade- based sanctions 
busters’. The impact of sanction busting will be considered below. 
 The popular reliance on economic sanctions provides a wealth of data to study. 
Frequency of sanctions has increased since the end of the Cold War, and recent sanctions are 
more likely to be multilateral. In order to study sanction effectiveness for future policy decisions, 
the research must extrapolate meaningful information from the use of economic sanctions. 
Thomas Weiss notes: “an ideal research world would contain meaningful data about a 
sufficiently large number of cases to permit comparative analyses” (Weiss 1999, 502). The 
issues facing sanction research includes whether or not similar cases can be subject to such 
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comparative analysis. The cases selected for this review provide ample support of the 
comparative value found in economic sanction episodes. Multiple variables can be present in the 
midst of sanction regimes, including military engagement, humanitarian concessions, and 
popular support. Sanction episodes can be long or short. They can be abandoned short of policy 
success or stubbornly adhered to even if success remains unlikely. Thankfully, when studying 
implemented sanctions and human suffering, available cases are low. Humanitarian concerns 
should be evaluated whether considering or evaluating sanctions. However, that does not degrade 
the importance of the study of the effectiveness and usefulness of sanctions as a diplomatic tool.  
 Ultimately, a multiple regression model can depoliticize the use of sanctions and arm 
policy makers with data supporting or refuting a chosen tactic for non-compliance to 
international standards. Policy considerations to engage in sanctions should contain clear 
guidelines for what goal(s) the sanctions intend to accomplish. Weiss notes, “rather than a knee-
jerk rejection, researchers rather should identify conditions under which sanctions may be 
employed morally and measures to strengthen accountability for their use. Otherwise, there is a 
single coercive option: military force” (Weiss 1999, 506). Weiss makes the point that sanctions 
are no more or less humane than military force; the devil here is in the details and management 
of implementation. There is a sample size problem in comparing countries suffering from 
sanctions only and countries suffering from both sanctions and military conflict. Research exists 
analyzing the data set of recent sanctions yet differing parameters in the cases used could skew 
measurable results. Hufbauer et al. (2011, 51) found that the likelihood of success was often 
determined by how modest the goal expected. But who determines whether a goal is modest or 
not removes the objectivity of study. 
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 Economic sanctions can be analyzed for their effectiveness in achieving desired goals, 
potential negative impacts on public health and economic viability, and theoretical validation for 
their use. Control variables include level of democratization of target country and sender 
country. Democracies are more likely to address the needs of their people (regardless of status 
with the international community) and are more likely to change behavior to satisfy the world 
community. True democratic leadership is more responsive to the needs of the people. Countries 
that are authoritarian or run by a small handful of political and economic elites are able to 
withstand sanctions by rewarding supporters as well as controlling and diverting distribution 
channels. This phenomenon has been identified in Haiti, Iraq, former Yugoslavia and North 
Korea. 
 Another problem with assessing a ‘proper’ policy response to actual sanctions data is the 
bias inherent in the political process. Policy failures can be downplayed when governments self-
report their results. Original goals can be muted or misrepresented, even in democracies. There is 
a tendency to put policy efforts in their best light, even among well-meaning bureaucrats. Policy 
makers may assume that their efforts will not fall victim to the errors of past policy attempts. 
Policy altruism and evolutionary principle encourage the belief that new efforts will be superior 
to those that came before. Military engagements are often planned with the best intentions of 
avoiding past mistakes and minimizing casualties and collateral damage. In regards to sanctions, 
those who propose new sanctioning efforts expect all the benefits with none of the previously 
documented harmful effects. Rather than abandoning the use of sanctions, efforts to modify the 




 The reason for moving to targeted sanctions is due to the negative humanitarian impact of 
past sanction regimes. A more complete study would compare all countries with the ability to be 
expanded for certain benchmarks and date ranges. A wealth of public health data compiled by 
the World Health Organization (2015) affords the international politics researcher to test 
prevailing theory and the effects of actions carried out by the community of nations. Multiple 
indicators of societal health allow a more thorough slope regression test to see if statistically 
significant. However, these studies vary in their assessment of whether a weakened regime with 
poor distribution to their population invited sanctions or whether sanctions are truly to blame for 
the lack of distribution (Alnsrawi 2012, Gordon 1999, Weiss 1999). Economic sanctions are 
intended to hurt to the point of changed behavior. Sanctions will be most effective if the data 
proves the impact does not miss the target. When the people suffer but the regime grows 
stronger, sanctions miss the mark. A wealth of opportunity exists in assessing the overall impact 
of sanctions and may ultimately challenge international theory and practice. 
 Many studies focus on whether sanctions work or whether they cause an independent 
undesired effect (like poor public health). But that belies the understanding of whether sanctions 
should be used at all. What happens when sanctions are examined in a multivariate study 
alongside other options, including diplomacy, the threat of sanctions and/or military force? Does 
the use of sanctions adhere to or circumvent existing international norms? Small sample size may 
reduce the ability to statistically analyze the effects of sanctions. In order to delve into this topic, 
quantitative analysis must be set aside to examine the theoretical. International norms and clarity 
of purpose to the international world order must be considered. 
 The use of economic sanctions is controversial and should not be engaged in lightly. As 
the world becomes more globally interconnected in the realms of commerce and trade, sanctions 
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have become the rod to beat the unruly state or regime. Sanctions may even be seen as a product 
of liberal internationalism, despite their historic applications. But should they be the shining 
example of this brave new world? Sanctions are an often used tool of foreign policy. They 
should be better understood, both in consequences and effectiveness. Ideally, economic sanctions 
should garner the same reticence as military action when determining foreign policy. 
 Scholars of international theory disagree on the theoretical basis for sanctions. Because 
coercive economic punishment has been utilized as part of statecraft since classical times, it is 
easy to apply realism to the use of sanctions. Sanctions are seen as zero-sum, with winners and 
losers in the world economic environment. However, most theorists would apply liberal 
internationalism as the basis for sanctions. After all, sanctions are employed to solidify 
international shared norms, and states are only punished for deviating from ideals the world 
community has already agreed upon. Sanction regimes themselves are constructivist. Finally, a 
cynical view would mention post-colonialism, as former colonial powers still exert much 
influence on the decision making bodies that originate sanctions. Economic coercion through 
sanctions is merely the modern version of colonial pressures of rich states onto poor states. 
International theories overlap when applied to the nature of sanctions. 
 This examination will begin with a look at economic sanctions over time in Chapter 2. As 
patterns of international cooperation and global commerce have accelerated in recent years, so 
has the use of economic sanctions. For this reason, the bulk of this study will focus on the past 
thirty years of sanctions policy. Chapter 3 examines economic sanctions in a theoretical lens. As 
international theory is applied to the use of economic sanctions, roots of realism, liberalism and 
constructivism are discovered. In addition, the perspective of post-colonialism will be applied to 
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the idea that current hegemons have merely established a world of haves and have-nots through 
implementation of sanction regimes. 
 Chapter 4 will discuss the pros and cons of sanction regimes. Use of economic coercion 
has unintended consequences that can burden the sender state more than the target in lost 
economic opportunities and diplomatic reputation costs. In addition, targeted states may engage 
in what Bryan Early (2015) calls sanction busting – the ability to satisfy economic demand 
through use of illicit trade networks or foreign aid. Chapter 5 considers prominent case studies of 
the 1990s that guide sanctions policy today, namely Haiti, Iraq and former Yugoslavia. The 
impact of sanctions in these countries led to the policy preference of smart sanctions today. This 
section will also consider two recent sanctions episodes in Iran and North Korea. Although 
quantitative analysis is currently lacking, successes in these episodes guide current understanding 
of sanctions policy. Chapter 6 will offer some concluding thoughts, suggestions for future 





Chapter 2: Defining Economic Sanctions 
 
The History of Economic Sanctions 
 A comprehensive historical and theoretical perspective on the use of economic sanctions 
in international statecraft seems best presented through comparative case studies. There are some 
who support the general use of sanctions, such as Lopez (2012) and Pattison (2015), despite 
acknowledging cases where either implementation or results were less than ideal. Much of the 
literature seems critical of sanctions, without fully conceptualizing a world without sanctions. 
Sanctions offer a way to signal and impose norm compliance. Hufbauer et al. (2011) present a 
longitudinal study, accepting new cases while reserving judgment on the use of sanctions to 
other theorists. The majority of the literature revolves around the following inquiries: how/why 
sanctions are implemented, how/why sanctions are ignored or circumvented, and how the use of 
sanctions has evolved over time (Martin 1992, 4).  
 During the Cold War, the use of sanctions reflected the power struggle between two 
competing hegemons. Acceptance of various sanctioning actions depended on which side of the 
fence a nation sat – the U.S. NATO alliance or the Soviet bloc. Due to the veto power of U.N. 
Security Council members, few sanction episodes had full support of the United Nations (Elliott 
2010, 85). Most notable were sanctions on South Africa’s apartheid regime, Portugal in the latter 
years of African colonialism, U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, North Korea and Somalia 
(Hufbauer et al. 2011, 20-28). In addition, a greater reliance on cooperation and a greater desire 
for international consensus have emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century. As the Cold 
War receded into a multipolar global power struggle, instances of multilateral sanctions became 
more common.  
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 Sanctions can be unilateral or multilateral. Unilateral sanctions are imposed by one 
sender nation. The United States is the most frequent originator of unilateral sanctions. Unilateral 
sanctions can become multilateral sanctions, if additional nations join a sanctions regime already 
in progress. In this way, unilateral sanctions may be a signaling method to other states, while 
soliciting their cooperation. Unilateral sanctions are easier to resist and ignore (Singleton and 
Griswold 1999, 88-89). Research on unilateral sanctions finds, “an overall success rate of only 
34% for 116 cases of sanctions from 1914 to 1990” (Weiss 2016, 501). Weiss refers to the 
Hufbauer et al. (2011) data set, which reaches the same policy conclusions. 
 Multilateral sanctions are preferred, and are believed to work at a higher rate (Hufbauer 
et al. 2011, 172-173). Recent scholarship challenges this: “Though previous findings have been 
mixed on whether having multilateral support for sanctioning efforts makes them more 
successful, sender governments still frequently seek to obtain international cooperation for their 
sanctions” (Early 2015, 59). Whether or not they are more profitable, multilateral sanctions are 
more preferred. As the world has increasingly relied on cooperation, through international 
organizations and regional alliances, multilateral sanctions are also more widely employed. 
 Most authors accept that sanctions work twenty-five to thirty-three percent of the time 
(Hurbauer et al. 2011, Drezner 2011, Early 2015).  Seemingly missing from the literature is the 
serious possibility of establishing global norms discouraging their use, or the understanding that 
sanctions are not only marginally effective but may be yet another offending strike to 
international cooperation and adhesion. International diplomacy fails when countries are 
marginalized and branded ‘rogue’ due to their own, albeit at times suspect, practice of state 
sovereignty. It is difficult to appreciate the global influence of the United States in supporting 
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freedom without leaving room for policy dissent. Those who adhere to the ideal of the equality 
of nations must seriously reconsider how certain nations are branded in the global marketplace. 
 Over the past century global trade and global political cohesion have affected the use of 
sanctions. Prior to the 20th century, a targeted state would not be the one punished by a world 
power implementing trade sanctions, as competing world powers could willingly adopt the new 
trade partner. The use of sanctions would seemingly only punish the state choosing to disengage 
in trade. Other coercive mechanisms, such as colonialism and mercantilism dominated the early 
period of world trade, where poorer countries were fleeced by richer nations and empires to fuel 
their reach. Therefore, an offending state could merely be subject to forced regime change or 
economic control implemented by the more powerful state. This can be seen in the Coercive Acts 
or Intolerable Acts imposed by Great Britain on the American colonies in 1774, along with 
numerous replacements of colonial governors by the controlling state. 
 With this historical perspective in mind, the use of sanctions may be seen as the best 
alternative among a set of unfavorable options. In the current international order, war must be 
avoided at all costs. Forced regime change and restrictive tariffs are prohibited under 
international norms. The use of temporary sanctions, specific to an undesired action or behavior 
(like nuclear proliferation), is seen as less violent based solely on undesirable competing 
alternatives. As a means of avoiding war, adding teeth to diplomacy, and targeting specific 
industries or oligarchs, sanctions are celebrated and preferred.  
 Liberal internationalism changed the way nations connect and trade with one another. 
The impact of globalization and economic interdependence is still relatively new to the field of 
research and scholarship. Other than specific postwar concessions, most countries were given 
equal footing in the post-world war economy. The League of Nations, followed by the United 
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Nations, ensured the international norm of ‘one state, one vote’ in presenting an international 
democratic ideal. Despite the relative strength of the United Nations, it is possible that true 
liberal internationalism was not achieved until after the end of the Cold War. Only then was the 
adversarial zero-sum game of competing hegemons abandoned for a more egalitarian world 
political economy. 
 Regarding sanctions, the ability to assess comprehensive sanctions was undermined by 
this adversarial bipolar hegemonic power struggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union – all but ensuring the failure of implemented sanctions. One side refusing to trade with a 
targeted country merely drove that country into alliance, politically and economically speaking, 
with the competing hegemon. Sanctions were seen as a way to avoid a ‘hot war’, though the time 
period was not marked by prolonged world peace. 
 Recent sanction episodes are questioned for their efficacy as well as their humanity. As 
an alternative to war, sanctions are stringently examined for their ability to successfully avoid the 
negative effects of war: death, decreased public health, lost economic productivity, and strain on 
remaining infrastructure. Although these effects are assumed with the outbreak of military 
conflict, the appearance of similar negative effects from sanction episodes in Haiti and Iraq in the 
1990s called the implementation of sanctions into question. Comprehensive (or blanket) 
sanctions were criticized for hurting the general population while those in charge of decision 
making were able to skirt their effects. Food and medical supplies, needed by the general 
population, can be diverted to military troops loyal to the regime. Worse, the lionization of the 
state could be used to stir up nationalist and patriotic support by the targeted regime. For this 
reason, sanctioning states and bodies have adopted more targeted sanctions, intended to only hurt 
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those loyal to a rogue regime. Also called ‘smart sanctions,’ targeted sanctions are preferred to 
the less precise, comprehensive sanctions. 
 Eriksson and Wallensteen (2015) study the likelihood that economic sanctions will lead 
to peaceful resolution. A spin on the question of ‘do sanctions work?’ is ‘do sanctions avoid 
armed conflict?’ It may be wise to consider whether armed conflict is inevitable when a country 
is demonized and marginalized by the world community. In order to truly achieve a democracy 
of nations, all nations should have the opportunity to be on equal footing, including in reputation. 
This may be unattainable as reputation costs follow a state from past actions. One may question 
whether targeted sanctions are not caught in the same political zero-sum game that dominates 
international competition. The authors claim, “the use of U.N. targeted sanctions is determined 
by Security Council politics more than by the evaluation of whether they would be the most 
appropriate tool. Sanctions may thus not be used in the cases for which they are most 
appropriate” (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2015, 1392). The politicization of the use of sanctions 
may undermine their very existence as a peaceful and egalitarian tool of statecraft. 
 Despite avoiding humanitarian concerns of broad based sanctions, targeted sanctions do 
not inherently lead to better results. Acceptance of these sanctions is mixed in the literature. As 
Eriksson and Wallensteen suggest, “further research is needed to arrive at a better understanding 
of how U.N. targeted sanctions are working in conjunction with the dynamics of intense conflict 
situations” (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2015, 1395). The authors suggest a framework for further 
sanctions research, yet admit the difficulty of viewing sanctions in a vacuum. Sanctions are often 
applied in conjunction with, or as a precursor to, military force. Correlation does not equal 
causation. The authors stop short of connecting sanctions and an overall concept of international 
imperialism that creates winners and losers in the political and economic balance of power. 
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Sanctions are generally credited with being useful for conflict management, but their role in 
conflict prevention or resolution is suspect at best. The authors conclude that sanctions play a 
role in conflict resolution – further research may strengthen this claim. In the sanctions cases 
they highlight, sanctions are naturally present in nations in conflict, and seemingly absent when 
the conflict reaches resolution. That does not mean that sanctions were the specific catalyst to 
achieve such resolution, and further study is warranted. 
Reliance on “Smart” Sanctions 
 A new form of economic sanctions is touted in removing ill effects. Smart (or targeted) 
sanctions “are designed to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime, while imposing minimal 
hardship on the mass public” (Drezner 2011, 96). Travel bans, personalized asset freezes, and the 
placement of sanctions on individuals rather than states are growing in popularity. These tactics 
make sense within the context of the War on Terror, where individual bad actors are targeted and 
marginalized independent of the state. Unfortunately, there is “no systematic evidence that smart 
sanctions yield better policy results” (Drezner 2011, 97). Smart sanctions may be implemented 
with stronger policy goals, thus decreasing their likelihood of success. Sanctions with modest 
goals, particularly those that do not require regime change, have a greater chance of success. 
 Drezner (2011), among other scholars, points out that the Iraq sanctions in 1991 did not 
seem to work. These sanctions carried humanitarian costs (the number of deaths and the 
skyrocketing price of food) and sender state blame, yet comprehensive sanctions did not cause 
the Hussein regime to dramatically alter its policies. It is folly to assume more targeted sanctions 
would have fared any better. Rogue regimes often use defiance to outside international pressure 
as staying power. Iraq did feel the effects of targeted sanctions. Overall GDP was cut nearly in 
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half and Iraq had to delay its nuclear weapons program, yet Saddam Hussein remained defiant. 
Still, this cautionary tale is considered an ‘extreme outlier’ in the literature. 
 Comprehensive sanctions (as opposed to smart) seem to help authoritarian regimes 
solidify power and grant contracts to elite supporters (Drezner 2011, 100). The type of regime 
targeted also seems to matter. Over the last 30 years, 78% of sanctions are used on non-
democracies even though sanctions are found most effective when a democracy is targeted 
(Hufbauer et al. 2011). Authoritarian states do not solicit the will of the people. Regimes that are 
responsible to the people generally are kept in check by the people. Smart sanctions still require 
further research to determine if they are truly more humane and more effective. Drezner’s (2011) 
advice is that the world needs to look beyond smart sanctions but does not formulate a type of 
sanction better conducive to compliance. Overall, Drezner is not sold on their efficacy: 
“[Sanctions] clearly solve the political problem of ‘doing something’ in the face of target state 
transgressions. They do not solve the policy problem of coercing the target state into changing its 
policies” (Drezner 2011, 104).  
 Joy Gordon (1999) reiterates the idea that Cold War sanctions were never comprehensive 
because targeted states could simply trade with other bloc. Haiti and Iraq sanction episodes in the 
1990s led to better use of sanctions (target elites, arms embargo) yet showed the negative effects 
of comprehensive sanctions. Gordon (2011) cites a 1997 Brown University and Notre Dame 
study that considers criminal activity caused by sanctions (Gordon 2011, 318). Arms embargoes 
seem to do little to impact flow of arms, as the restricted trade leaves room for the establishment 
of a black market and higher profits for sanction busters. A 2007 study showed state actors 
comply only twenty-five percent of the time with arms embargoes (Gordon 2011, 321-323). 
Further, targeted sanctions are no more effective than traditional broad based sanctions, and 
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bring up new problems, like due process rights for suspected sanction breakers with no criminal 
history. Wallensteen (2012, 225) asserts that targeted sanctions on individuals work less than 
twenty percent of the time. 
Recent Concerns of Sanctions 
 The main understandable concern in regards to sanctions is do they work? Do sanctions 
foster compliance with international norms and values in a way that military coercion or 
diplomacy does not? Not surprisingly, the bulk of literature on the impact of economic sanctions 
involves specific case studies. An overview of the most common cases follows—results of 
economic sanctions manifested in these cases is instrumental in the crafting and use of sanctions 
today. The general consensus is that in order for sanctions to be both humane and effective, 
smart (or targeted) sanctions should be employed. 
 However, it must be addressed that sanctions do not have to force changed behavior if 
deemed satisfactory to the imposing state(s). There is an intrinsic value to satisfying the political 
pressure to ‘do something’ short of military force. Even in the war on terrorism, a targeted 
economic sanction to a key industry or commodity sector accused of financing illegal acts could 
be seen as more noble than a series of targeted drone strikes. Understanding financial networks 
could also have an intrinsic intelligence benefit, especially if initial sanctions do not do the trick. 
Assessing the political and economic capabilities of rogue states and/or regimes can assist future 
proposals to apply pressure to the point that leads to changed behavior. It is understood that 
sanctions are intended to hurt – insistence on use of targeted sanctions asserts that the ‘right’ 
people will be hurt. Yet targeted sanctions bring up their own issues of due process and 
protection of individual rights. 
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 Recent efforts have been made by the U.N. Security Council to ensure human rights are 
not neglected in imposing sanctions. U.N. Human Rights norms demand egalitarian patterns of 
treatment, even in the imposition of sanctions. Similar to a writ of attainder, targeted individuals 
deserve to know why they are targeted and the chance to defend or refute the targeting. A 
December 2009 U.N. Resolution set up an office of ombudsperson to receive requests for 
removal from any targeted lists. The imposition of human rights as a check to misguided 
sanctions is a positive development. However, it must be noted that the ombudsperson was only 
created as sanctions shifted from targeting only states to targeting individuals in the war on terror 
– no such check exists for states long deemed “outliers” or “rogue states” by the general 
consensus of the international community or by the current hegemonic powers. 
 Another impact studied in the use of sanctions is the size of economic effect on a targeted 
state. The majority of sanctions have less than a 3% effect on overall GDP (Hufbauer et al. 2011, 
120-124). Severe outliers exist, such as the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq, but the 
more common effect is a muted economic impact. Yet the authors make the point that 
governments win and lose elections based on marginal gains: “Of course, government officials 
fight very hard for policy changes that might increase GDP by 2 percent, and elections are won 
or lost and coups staged with the expenditures of far less money” (Hufbauer et al. 2005, 105). A 
small change in GDP is political fuel in both dictatorships and democracies. And the mere 
imposition of sanctions can have a negative effect – inspiring a ‘rally round the flag’ reaction. A 
commonly presented example is the sanctions episode on pre-WWII Italy over the annexation of 
Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Mussolini successfully engaged the populace in international resistance 
due to the marginalization effect of imposed sanctions. Still, the modern consensus is that 
targeted sanctions are the preferred way to go. 
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 The current literature suggests that targeted sanctions can be used as a diplomatic tool. 
These sanctions may target ruling dynastic families or their strongest supporters individually—as 
in travel bans or denied visas—or target specific industries and products connected to the regime. 
Targeted sanctions differ from comprehensive sanctions, such as naval blockades or trade 
embargoes. The history of economic sanctions is generally divided into two eras of international 
cooperation: pre-Cold War (1914 to 1990) and post-Cold War (1990 to present). Comprehensive 
sanctions did not exist during the Cold War era, as sanctions imposed by the United States or the 
West could always be ‘busted’ by turning to the contrary Soviet bloc – or vice versa. The 
literature generally finds that democratic countries are more likely to respond favorably to 
sanctions than autocratic countries. Understanding the history of economic sanctions can aid the 





Chapter 3: How International Theory Relates to Sanctions 
 
 The field of international relations is currently dominated in scholarship by the theories 
of realism, liberal internationalism, and constructivism. Realism evokes pragmatic or practical 
theory – states will act in their own best interests and may attempt to coerce other states to 
further that interest. By promoting symbiosis economically and politically, the liberal goal is for 
countries to rely on the continued support and connections to other countries. Put simply, 
countries should care what other countries think. International politics are essentially a voluntary 
organization, dependent on the consent of member states to agree on policy in order to 
implement policy domestically. Institutions and voluntary organizations constitute constructed 
vehicles to further international policy goals. At times, countries may become rogue outliers of 
the international consensus. An example would be a country seeking nuclear armament. Per 
liberal theory, if countries care what others think and want to engage in the benefits of global 
trade, then economic sanctions will be an effective way to politically shame and economically 
impact a target state into norm compliance. 
 In a post-Cold War world of general cooperation among U.N. members, countries under 
sanctions may not have a viable course of appeal. Economic needs and wants still exist, even if 
political variables place a state on the outs with the international consensus. Some manufacturing 
sectors cannot respond quickly of efficiently enough to bridge the gap. Black markets and 
increased smuggling are naturally made more lucrative within a country under sanctions – this is 
referred to as ‘sanction busting’ in the literature (Early 2015). Further, an oppressive regime that 
already controls the means of production and distribution can route the limited supply of 
necessary items to its supporters. There is a world humanitarian interest connected to liberal 
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internationalism that is concerned when countries oppress their own people, especially the 
powerless. 
 In truth, economic sanctions are intended to hurt. The question centers on whether the 
‘right’ people are hurt – supporters of rogue regimes over innocent civilians. If sanctions have a 
general effect on public health, it should show up with statistical significance in the data. 
Military action often destroys distribution networks and collateral damage can impact hospitals, 
roads and infrastructure. Economic sanctions are not intended to target these, but over time they 
can affect them in similar fashion as rogue regimes allocate scarce resources to supporters and 
the military over the general public health and welfare. The number of years a country is under 
sanctions increases the ability to disrupt essential parts of the targeted country, often due to 
allocation of limited resources. 
 Recent scholarship has challenged how sanctions are used in a theoretical context. 
Brzoska (2003), Eriksson and Wallensteen (2015), Pattison (2015) and Elliott (2010) focus their 
research on the power of the United Nations in taking the lead on smart sanctions and reform 
efforts. Their qualitative reviews of the policy side of the debate have merit, but would be better 
armed with data analysis backing their claims. Unfortunately, much of the data in the field of 
sanctions is either too broad or too narrow. There appears to be a dearth of mid-range theorizing 
in regards to past sanction regimes. Although theoretical value can come from a broad array of 
qualitative analysis, the field currently appears to be lacking in comprehensive quantitative 
backing of generally accepted results of sanctions. 
 An area of interest for recent sanction research is the ongoing pressure on Syria. Sen et al. 
(2013) find progress in maternal mortality and infant mortality rates in Syria despite economic 
sanctions. The authors note considerable effects from both violence and sanctions impacting 
20 
 
multiple societal sectors, despite awareness of past sanctions crises. As in Haiti in the early 
1990s, the Syrian “health sector now faces destruction from on-going violence compounded by 
economic sanctions that has affected access to health care, to medicines and to basic essentials as 
well as the destruction of infrastructure” (Sen et al. 2013, 195). Why are humanitarian concerns 
still overlooked? This may be due to compounding factors: military violence creates a need for 
health services due to wounded fighters and civilians, military activity can destroy healthcare 
facilities or crucial transportation infrastructure, and economic sanctions can limit the flow of 
goods—including medical supplies. Governments under economic and military siege can focus 
health resources on military over civilian populations. The Ministry of Health and Central 
Bureau of Statistics as well as the 2010 World Health Organization Statistics (Sen et al. 2013) 
appear to encapsulate data one to two years short of what is now impacting Syria—an ongoing 
sectarian civil war that has led to a mass displacement of its population. Refugee resettlement 
programs may shield the true impact of war and sanctions. A multiple regression study analyzing 
the overall impact would be of high importance, once data is available. Much of the research on 
sanctions seems focused on the impact during or immediately after the imposition of sanctions. 
More longitudinal study on lasting effects of sanctions could broaden the understanding of their 
full effect. 
 Current international support for sanctions is characterized by the role of liberal 
internationalism, particularly in the creation and maintenance of the United Nations. The utility 
and acceptance of sanctions as a coercive tool is an established norm within international 
relations. Constructivism also plays a role, as various sanction regimes are constructed to assist 
the implementation of each sanction episode. In addition, sanction regimes adhere to the notion 
of norm construction. The historical basis of the modern world order stems from the theory of 
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liberalism. Liberal internationalism rose from the Kantian notion that people can make for 
themselves a free, secure and prosperous world (Dunne et al. 2016, 69). But if the chance at 
prosperity hinges upon staying in the good graces of established world elites, can it really be said 
that true liberalism has been achieved? If some states are unwelcome at the table of prosperity, 
like North Korea or Iraq, simply due to the freedoms expressed by charismatic regimes, then it is 
difficult to tout a world order based on equality and true economic interdependence.  
 The United Nations is the crowning achievement of a century of striving towards liberal 
internationalism. An organization of independent states, debating norms and values that are 
shared in common, was first conceived in the early twentieth century in response to global 
warfare. Liberal internationalism won as the prevailing theory. The acceptance of the world 
order, from the United Nations and various intergovernmental organizations to the Bretton 
Woods financial framework, involved all countries in a symbiotic framework of commerce and 
mutual well-being. 
 The solution for oppressive autocracy is economic openness. As states engage in and 
become dependent on trade with others, they are more receptive to the values and norms adhered 
to by those trade partners. Autocracies changed at the barrel of a gun are often replaced by other 
autocracies. But when consumers and producers among the people emerge as viable stakeholders 
in how states engage with other states, the demand for products and trade supersedes demand for 
warfare. So why would liberal internationalists adhere to a system that excluded some states 
from trade? Or that encouraged illicit trade networks, establishing incentives for those who broke 
international norms and restrictions? 
 The growth in membership in inter-governmental organizations, proportion of states’ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in international over domestic trade, and rise in democracies 
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over the past sixty years speaks to a world embracing liberalism. The increased use of economic 
sanctions by sole actors and international institutions belies this trend. After all, liberalism does 
not concede that international institutions should take the place of oppressive alliances 
established to bully or belittle unwanted states. Does a reliance on economic sanctions as a tool 
of economic coercion accomplish a world system of allies and outliers, haves and have-nots? 
Does the shame of being branded a ‘rogue regime’ reflect the desire for egalitarianism in 
international politics? 
 The prevailing research on sanctions supports the baseline use of liberal internationalism. 
Hufbauer et al. (2011) finds that democracies, existing trade relationships, existing political 
relationships or alliances, and shared membership in international institutions make countries 
more likely to respond favorably to economic sanctions. Economic coercion works best among 
friends. Part of the theory here is that goods are not the only things in constant exchange – 
outward looking countries also exchange ideas. Yet Brian Early’s work (2015) refutes this idea: 
allies and trade partners are more likely to become third party sanctions busters, at times using 
the political cover of diplomatic alliance. Ignoring sanctions and strong public denouncement 
may need to be added to the list of accepted political and social coercive tools. Busting sanctions 
is seen as a set of negative actions as long as economic sanctions are seen as a positive tool of 
statecraft. 
 Economic sanctions are an overtly coercive tool, and work as a form of signaling. States 
wish to punish or pressure other states into different action. This pressure does not seem to stem 
from liberal democratic ideals. Dunne et al. posit “democracies operate internally on the 
principle that conflicts are to be resolved peacefully by negotiation and compromise, without 
resort to the threat or use of organized violence” (Dunne et al. 2016, 75). Democracies also rely 
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on interest groups and lobbying influences within the political system. Industries and 
corporations with economic stakes in open trade with other countries will exert pressure to keep 
those trade channels open, regardless of ideological agreement with the sanctioning regime. This 
applies to domestic and third party firms. Further, the proclivity to bust sanctions or shame 
sender states introduces a new era of free-riding with little risk of reprisal. 
 To what degree was the rejection of early liberal international institutions like the League 
of Nations a reflection of improper function? Was the League merely a blunt instrument to bully 
small and disempowered states into submission to establish an international consensus among the 
‘winners’ of World War I? The United States did not join the League of Nations and rejected the 
concept of a harmony of nations emerging from realist power politics. The signatories of the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 essentially imposed sanctions on the losers in favor of giving war 
spoils and reparations to the victor nations. Treaties or alliances (including, by extension, NATO 
and the EU) reinforce a system that picks winners and losers. Those favored with the ability to 
join gain certain benefits not afforded to those rejected or ignored. This zero-sum game may be 
more reflective of traditional realism than liberal internationalism. However, Ikenberry (2011, 
59-60) traces the liberal world order as far back as 1815, and asserts it will outlast American 
hegemony. 
 The United States, the leading proponent of economic sanctions, generally adopts a 
liberal internationalist form of foreign policy. Often, U.S. presidents guide their foreign policy in 
altruistic standards. Dempsey and Fontaine note, “the Clinton administration regarded its 
democratic enlargement agenda as a means to another goal: the goal of creating as idealistic new 
world free of widespread inhumanity” (Dempsey and Fontaine 2001, 8). The Bush and Obama 
administrations solidified the use of U.S. foreign pressure to achieve humanitarian goals. Despite 
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adopting a nationalist and near protectionist trade policy, the Trump administration has been 
strongly encouraged to pressure and punish foreign states through the use of sanctions, most 
notably Iran, North Korea and Russia.  
 In defense of U.N. sanctions, a number of sanction episodes pressured governments to 
respect the rights of minority groups within their borders. The Nazi repression and genocide of 
its Jewish population is the ultimate cautionary tale of the international community looking the 
other way. By preserving state sovereignty, the basic right of a dispossessed people group to life 
was threatened. This continued in twentieth century African and European conflicts and has 
created threats of potential genocide to the present day. Although the goals presented under 
liberal internationalism protect minority groups and smaller states, in actual practice, these ideals 
are suspect at best and non-existent at worst. Perhaps it is time to reassess which theory is 
dominant in the current world order. 
 Post-colonialism is in its nature a rejection of the world order. Whether exploitation is 
blatant or subtle, the premise focuses on the moral implications of any set of nations having sway 
over the sovereignty of another. If sanctions are an acceptable tool of forced coercion based on 
bad behavior, who gets to decide what behaviors are deemed bad? And what behaviors warrant 
sanctions? The ability to crush an economy, bastardize a people group, and choose winners and 
losers in the world order is not a far cry from the colonial system of competing hegemons. Is the 
U.N. merely a re-packaging of a colonial system of world powers and insignificant countries? 
 A common defense of sanctions, even ineffective episodes, is that the targeting country 
satisfies political pressure to ‘do something.’ Is this not the height of arrogance and essentially 
the driving force of the former system of colonialism? Ignoring humanitarian costs imposed 
upon the target state in order to satisfy domestic political wants seems inconsistent with modern 
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theory. Liberal internationalism is about making the world a better place. Sanctions imposed for 
sanctions’ sake center around self-satisfaction in foreign policy. This seems inconsistent with the 
spread and continuance of liberal internationalism. 
 A prevailing flaw of liberal internationalism is that democratization is assumed. It is 
naively believed that all countries value equality, civic activism, and representative government. 
History tells a different story. The belief that all countries are on the same evolutionary path, that 
democracy and economic interdependence will eventually be realized across the globe centers 
more on hopefulness than academic research. The idea that all nations and people groups aspire 
to the same concept of global interdependence is not well supported. 
 Social contract theory unpacked to its darkest implications asserts that autocratic 
governments exist, to some degree, because the people want centralized direction no matter the 
costs. Multiple competing interests may be satisfied by an autocratic authority. Satisfying elite 
interests, constructing a common enemy through propaganda and rhetoric, and removing the 
weight of responsibility that comes with true democratic governance tickle the selfish desires of 
men. Liberal Internationalism assumes some degree of selflessness in world leaders. However, 
not all enter politics for altruistic means – even in the greatest democracies, power is bestowed 
and maintained by coaxing the right special interest group(s). 
 Another flawed assumption is that globalization and world trade are desired by all and are 
mutually beneficial. The greatest challenge to this line of thinking rests within the theoretical 
tradition of post-colonialism: The ones who benefit from global capitalism are those who own 
the capital. The countries that established capital and industrial bases on the backs of a colonial 
system could be seen as having an unfair head start on the rest of the world. The inherent fairness 
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of a system tied to the winners and losers of the past can be called into question sociologically 
and historically. 
 I would argue that the United Nations does not fully operate from the principles of liberal 
internationalism. It may appear liberal in word, but it is mostly constructivist in deed. The U.N. 
constructs organizations to tackle the problems of the world. It constructs norms and ‘shared’ 
values that all nations must embrace, or face punishment (with notable exceptions, particularly 
nuclear proliferation). Mostly, it constructs a system where the ‘haves’ do not fear being replaced 
by the ‘have nots’. From Bretton Woods to the Security Council veto, there are various 
mechanisms that ensure true equality is never attained. Ultimately, the U.N. and its various 
international organizations construct winners and losers in the global race for power and wealth. 
Losers may be rogue states, states unwilling to give up sovereignty when rejecting global norms, 
or marginalized people groups unable to fully employ principles of democratic self-
determination simply due to how the borders are drawn (Catalan, Kurdistan, Palestine, 
Chechnya, Rohingya, and others). Further research into the nature of the world construct could 
benefit the breadth of the literature. Group dynamics, comparative evolutionary arcs, and other 
means of coercive punishment will be deferred to further study. For now, an examination of 





Chapter 4: Pros and Cons of Economic Sanctions 
 
 Inherent in the literature are important questions: Do sanctions affect desired change? Do 
they hurt the ‘right’ people? Can they hurt the ‘wrong’ ones? Do travel bans and asset freezes 
inherently cause influential officials to change policy? Or do such actions merely trap otherwise 
pioneering officials in a failing state? Lost in the current assumptions surrounding sanctions 
policy is the overall impact to GDP as an accurate assessor of sanctions’ strength due to the 
ability and desire to target key players in a rogue regime. The pros and cons of implementing 
sanctions should be properly understood by all policy makers before implementing new sanction 
regimes. Current sanctions may need to be re-examined. 
 Pros include the ability to respond to domestic pressures to ‘do something’ in the face of 
human rights abuses or other norm violations. Sanctions are less impactful than military action, 
another form of coercive policy. Sanctions hold a place on the continuum between doing nothing 
and military attack. For that reason alone, their use is understandable. The threat of sanctions can 
lead to enhanced diplomacy. That threat would be less likely if sanctions were prohibited or 
rarely used. In that regard, sanctions on one state can serve as a deterrent to abhorrent behavior 
by another state. 
 Cons include the low rate of effectiveness – about one in three sanctions episodes achieve 
their desired effect. Sanctions can be long in duration and economically costly to the sender state 
and its allies. Sanctions could be seen as a form of imperialism, where strong established 
countries set the rules and norms for weaker, less established countries. In that regard, little 
freedom is given for norm creation by weaker states. The use of sanctions invites a quid pro quo 
in boycotts or trade restrictions by third party states. What if the United States, the chief 
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implementer of sanctions, was sanctioned for its controversial drone policy? The U.S. may 
benefit from being a unipolar state helping to establish a liberal order. Ikenberry suggests “in 
such a system, the hegemon itself is not bound by the rule of law” (Lake 2012, 249). Sanctions 
can also strengthen additional markets, banks and supply chains to grow while senders remove 
themselves from a market demand condition. Finally, sanctions can hurt the weakest among the 
population of targeted states. 
 Potential health indicators include adult mortality rate, incidence of disease, water and 
sanitation, among other indicators. Allen and Lektzian’s study (2013, 127) finds several negative 
variables present in sanctioned states: “increases in infant deaths, wastage, and stunting of 
children; decreased visits to medical facilities; reported cases of previously eradicated diseases, 
rise in percent low weight infants, deterioration of water supply or quality.” The authors then 
compare these variables to economic indicators:  
adverse changes in income distribution, declining availability of essential goods, change in 
urban/rural population mix; population indicators: expansion of refugee camps or voluntary 
migration; governance/civil society include increased crime and repression, fewer 
independent civic organizations, suppression of political parties and independent media; 
humanitarian activities – inability to meet growing needs (Allen and Lektzian 2013, 127).  
 
Ultimately the authors found that military conflict had a greater effect on public health than 
economic sanctions. Still, the public health concern remains. 
 International economic statecraft centers around one question: do economic sanctions 
work? To address this, researchers may inquire as to whether or not the imposition of economic 
sanctions effectively changed state behavior. Or they may look at whether economic sanctions 
negatively impacted a targeted state’s GDP or trade relationships. Further, researchers may study 
the harm done by sanctions, as measured in economic indicators or various public health 
qualifiers. Economic sanctions can be seen as ‘working’ simply by adding external pressure to a 
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state acting outside of international norms or expected behavior, regardless of how targeted 
regimes react to sanctions.  
 Are economic sanctions the most effective coercive tool? Or do they only exacerbate an 
already shaky regime? Does recorded suffering and hardship on the most vulnerable determine 
that another means of international coercion should be employed? These are the questions that 
affect policy decisions in how to confront bad actors in international politics. Currently, the 
international community favors the use of sanctions over military action. Diplomacy seems to be 
the ideal conflict resolution mechanism, but in the absence of willing participants there lacks a 
coercive means to force a diplomatic agreement. The UN Charter permits military action only in 
cases of state survival or self-defense to an actual military attack. Therefore, sanctions are 
preferable to enforce international agreements or global norms. Recent scholarship has 
challenged the idea that sanctions are effective and can be imposed without negative impacts to 
society. This brings up a persistent question in the field of international relations: are economic 
sanctions a humane way to force change in state behavior? 
 A quantitative look at sanctions centers on measured results. Do policy makers get what 
they want? More specifically, is the process of imposing sanctions on a rogue state worth the 
costs? Do elites connected to the misfit regime in question suffer? Or do economic sanctions end 
up hurting those already compromised by oppressive regimes? Sanctions are touted as the more 
‘humane’ option of statecraft, as compared to military action, particularly in minimizing the 
suffering of civilians and non-combatants. Yet the literature differs on the extent to which 
sanctions affect innocent civilians. Multi-causality applies to each case, yet the decision of 
whether to employ sanctions continues to challenge foreign policy makers. In order to suggest 
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that sanctions are less humane than military action, it must be proven that sanctions have a 
statistically significant effect on public health. 
 The seminal study of economic sanctions referred to and utilized throughout much of the 
literature is the work of Hufbauer et al. (2011) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. The third 
edition takes a substantial look at sanctions following the end of the Cold War. The initial entry 
was released in 1985, with 103 sanction episodes making up the study. Sanctions were often a 
Cold War staple, where effective diplomacy and coercive statecraft were non-existent and 
military force unimaginable. The second edition was released in 1991, leaving a substantial gap 
in covering recent sanction episodes since the end of the Cold War. Covering 116 sanction 
episodes, this edition found that sanctions work 34% of the time. However, other studies refute 
what constitutes a successful sanction. One question that does not seem to get much attention is 
how much is enough?  A one percent effective rate would satisfy the question ‘do sanctions 
work?’ But do sanctions work to such a degree that they should be employed in the future? Is it 
acceptable that two out of every three sanction episodes ends in failure? Or is thirty four percent 
an unfairly low number, failing to quantify the political effects of ‘doing something’ to curtail 
the unwanted behavior of a rogue regime? Put simply, sanctions may be effective in quelling 
domestic or international political pressure even if they do not fully lead to changed state 
behavior. Multiple studies exist where the results and the ancillary effects of sanctions are 
measured and quantified.  
 The Hufbauer data set (2011) includes over 174 case studies of sanctions episodes in their 
statistical analysis. Quantitative data exists to show that sanctions effectively lower GDP. 
However, do enough studies show sanctions inherently lead to better policy? Is it possible to 
measure the amount of detrimental actions that almost happened but were swayed by sanctions? 
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The qualitative case study format is therefore not without merit. The literature finds similar 
claims across varying regions. Weiss (2016, 501) asserts: “A review of multilateral sanctions 
against South Africa, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and Haiti suggests that sanctions in and of 
themselves did not bring desired changes…The contribution was substantial in the case of South 
Africa, considerably less in Iraq and Yugoslavia, and non-existent in Haiti. At the same time, 
sanctions always caused civilian pain, ranging from justifiable in South Africa to intolerable in 
Iraq.” Weiss questions sanctions on humanitarian grounds as well as claims of effectiveness. 
Again, this inspires true quantitative analysis to see if the contentions made in the literature are 
statistically significant. Applying similar studies to other sample sets may be of value. 
Analysis of Economic Sanctions 
 The imposition of economic sanctions often has the practical utility of hurting the sender 
state economically. A potential trade partner can be removed. Sanctions have been credited as 
working (about 33% of the time by most research) but sanctions are much more likely to affect 
policy when only a modest goal is required (such as the extradition of terrorists by Libya in the 
1990s) or a strong international consensus demands policy change (such as the demands on 
South Africa’s apartheid regime). Multilateral sanctions are found to be more effective than 
unilateral in most cases.  
 Sanctions are not a substitute for military or intelligence operations regarding regime 
change, as targeted regimes will often ‘dig in’ and seek sympathy from the overall populace or 
help facilitate lucrative illicit trade networks. Every case is different, and the ability to ‘hit them 
where it hurts’ is essential in determining whether sanctions will ultimately be effective. The 
most detrimental impact to illicit trade networks is the removal of sanctions, where profits shrink 
and legitimate competitors reemerge. But self-removal of a sender state from an increasingly 
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competitive global trade community seems merely to open doors for other trade partners. The 
growth of China and Dubai testify to the loss of trade by the United States due to sanctions 
(Early 2015). As the United States removes its economic importance to various countries it is 
politically or ideological upset with, the power dynamic can ultimately shift away from any 
legitimate hegemonic influence. If a target state no longer needs the United States for trade or 
security, to what degree will it submit to the U.S. lead in policy or norm creation? 
 The literature tends to support the concept that sanctions lead to failure in most cases. 
Despite achieving policy goals, which generally happens one third of the time (Hufbauer et al. 
2011), the wake of illicit trade and domestic structural strain left by economic sanctions ought to 
discourage their use.  
We conclude that there are a number of negative outcomes resulting from applying sanctions, 
and that they stem exactly from the fact that sanctions purport to have a general and 
principled justification. The six kinds of such consequences examined--susceptibility to 
manipulation, paternalism, abandonment of strict moral criteria, general decline in moral 
consciousness, a sweeping rise of violence and continuous redefining of the conditions for a 
final lifting of sanctions--affect not only those against whom the sanctions are directed, but 
also those who implement and maintain them. The result is that sanctions function as a form 
of siege and, as such, sanctions represent an act of war (Babic and Jokic 2000, 99).  
 
When sanctions are seen for what they truly are, a form of economic siegecraft, the international 
community is forced to reevaluate the norms surrounding their use. 
 Not all scholars fully place the blame on economic sanctions. Von Einsedel and Malone 
(2006) look at the aftermath of economic sanctions in Haiti and conclude the fault lies with the 
inability of domestic actors to step up and lead their country back to prosperity or at least 
stability. Even when determining pros and cons, it is important to consider other factors at play, 
like ineffective governance. 
This case presents an instance in which UN operations were broadly successful, but in which 
the patient failed to recover and eventually collapsed fully in 2004 requiring massive renewed 
international intervention. While it provides sobering lessons on the UN’s readiness for 
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overseeing long-term peacebuilding, the main responsibility for failure, in our view, lies with 
Haitian political actors (Von Einsedel and Malone 2006, 154).  
 
The authors applaud U.N. efforts to engage regional authorities, in this case the Organization of 
American States, in carrying out efforts of economic punishment, humanitarian monitoring, or 
reconstruction. However, these authors focus more on the nation-building process, and decry the 
severity of military and economic coercion in Haiti. Sanctions are but one part of that equation. 
Many scholars wrestle with controlling for societal damage from military activity, which 
permeates many cases of sanctions. Most place the burden of state building on the state itself. 
That may be exceptionally short-sighted considering the economic and social ramifications 
burdening a state under sanctions. If the international community is truly interested in economic 
development, the negative effects of sanctions ought to be more closely examined. 
 Comparative study has enacted some policy change. The same authors applaud a better 
use of sanctions:  
Alongside the Iraq sanctions regime, admittedly much more severe in its humanitarian impact, 
the Haiti case reinforced the UN’s growing ambivalence towards mandatory economic 
sanctions… the Security Council has never again resorted to such crude measures and it has 
since developed and refined targeted sanctions, mostly in the form of travel and financial 
embargoes (Von Einseidel and Malone 2006, 162).  
 
However, this may merely be a case of changing policy just enough to stay ahead of the research. 
Haitian sanctions failed because bad actors on the ground were able to circumvent restrictions 
and use the embargo to their advantage. Targeted sanctions intend to hurt the bad acting ruling 
regime, but are they more successful in doing so? Entrenched power brokers have more channels 
available to avoid intended ill effects.  
 In the literature, the negatives seem to outweigh the positives: “Following the experience 
with sanctions in the 1990s, critics began…arguing that sanctions are a potentially immoral 
foreign policy tool that indiscriminately and unjustly targets poor and innocent elements of 
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society” (Allen and Lektzian 2012, 121). In addition to studying their effectiveness, the morality 
of sanctions is often questioned. Allen and Lektzian (2012, 133) state, “sanctions are less likely 
than military conflict to result in deaths, but by reducing resources they can have a comparable 
effect on the ability of individuals to lead healthy lives.” In determining whether sanctions 
should be used as a tool of economic statecraft, ‘better than war’ is still a very low bar to set.  
 Susan Allen and David Lektzian (2012, 123) offer a generalized theory: “Economic 
Sanctions will have a negative effect on health outcomes.” Their study focuses on effects of 
sanctions on food supply from 1990 to 2007. By their own admission, the authors find most 
studies on sanctions, “more anecdotal and largely done in case study form” (Allen and Lektzian 
2012, 132).  Where the literature seems to fall short is in comparing countries under sanctions to 
themselves in regards to prior benchmarks of public health, rather than comparing countries 
under sanctions to the international community as a whole. One might suggest a more 
comparative trend analysis scoring all countries over a given number of years on public health 
measures. That way, general changes in policy, such as regional efforts to embrace universal 
healthcare by the European Union in the early 2000s, will not risk the data being merely 
anecdotal. 
 As mentioned above, there are multiple detrimental effects left in the wake of economic 
sanctions. Marginalization and exclusion from the world economy, the development and 
strengthening of domestic illegal activity, the effects on public health, and the encouraging of 
power brokers to reward supporters and punish detractors are all ill effects of imposed sanctions. 
It is difficult to imagine a world beyond economic punishment and extraterritorial coercion. That 
concept is what most international organizations purport to be about. Equality and fairness are 
the very lifeblood of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
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a host of other non-government organizations and international actors. But economic sanctions 
may provide a necessary evil that helps achieve or at least lead to a more equitable world. 
Sanction Busting and International Consensus 
 Liberal internationalism assumes a world order of general peace and cooperation. Refusal 
to abide by political norms may invite economic sanctions. Sanctions may be imposed by the 
general consensus of nations, often through United Nations decree, or by unilateral action, as the 
United States is in the habit of doing. However, just as adherence to international norms can be 
seen as a duty and expectation of states, regimes with policies at odds with the international 
consensus may be expected to offer resistance to outside control. The refusal to alter policy as a 
result of imposed sanctions, or the establishment of trade networks that ‘bust’ the imposed 
restrictions can be seen as heroic and patriotic in even the most oppressive of regimes. 
Neighboring states may disagree with the full implementation of imposed sanctions. 
 Bryan Early (2015) inspires a new discipline of international economic scholarship in 
Busted Sanctions. He describes two basic types of sanctions busting activity: trade based and aid 
based. Trade based sanction busting is when a third party stands to benefit economically from 
engaging in trade behavior with the target state. The impact of sanction busting on Albania’s 
GDP in the mid to late 1990s is a good example of that phenomenon, though some political 
motivation also may have been present in assisting a neighboring state.  
 Early describes three reasons why a state might buck the international consensus: “(1) a 
political interest in undercutting the sanctions against the target, (2) whether trade-based sanction 
busting on behalf of the target is profitable, and (3) whether third-party governments have the 
resources to offer extensive foreign aid to target states” (Early 2015, 63). The last point is 
crucial. Although the aid based support given Cuba by the Soviet Union to undermine U.S. 
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sanctions during the Cold War is a popular conception of sanctions busting, it is found to be the 
exception, not the rule. In most cases, states will pursue what is in their best interest, both 
politically and economically. Although states may share political solidarity with a targeted state, 
that does not mean they will have the economic ability to financially support the target, 
particularly through an extended period of imposed sanctions.  
 Sanctions can be avoided by the target state by seeking neighboring states to bust through 
economic barriers. This is a lesson that should be understood when imposing sanctions on 
regional hegemons, like Iran and Russia. Regional powers can pressure existing economic 
partners to come to their aid. Despite the general international consensus of supporting apartheid 
era sanctions, South Africa essentially forced landlocked neighbors to sanction bust in exchange 
for port access. Smuggling and mislabeling the source or final destination could easily be 
achieved by a state dependent on the target state. Iran may not have ‘forced’ assistance from the 
U.A.E., but the economic incentives were too great to pass up. Bryan Early (2015) split the 
U.A.E. sanctions busting into two periods: 1979-1994 and 1994-2005. Most surprisingly, the 
U.A.E. continued to operate as an economic lifeline to Iran even after the ruling regime signed a 
mutual security pact with the United States in 1994. As it turned out, the security pact granted 
the U.A.E. the political cover to continue to engage in busting.  
 Originally, Early (2015, 93) found “Iran uniquely vulnerable” to US sanctions. Iran 
suffered from import and export dependence prior to 1979, leading the initial two years of 
sanctions successful in releasing hostages and hurting Iran’s economy. As Iran moved into the 
1980s, alternate economic partners were found to fill the gaps left by the United States. 
Australia, Japan, Netherlands, U.K. and Italy filled trade gap left by U.S. self-removal (Early 
2015, 97). In the U.A.E., Dubai’s free port status and lack of comprehensive cargo inspections 
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‘unless suspicious’ made it a prime candidate for sanctions busting. Its laissez-faire policy 
combined with geographic proximity to Iran made satisfying Iran’s demand for trade too 
lucrative to pass up. To fully conceptualize the disparity of policy to action, while Emirati 
soldiers helped to liberate Kuwait its traders helped to resupply Iraqi regime (Early 2015, 105). 
The Abu Dhabi government gave Iraq billions while Dubai merchants set up trade with Iran 
(Early 2015, 111). Oddly enough, the very freedom that America purports to spread was 
practiced by Emirati traders in establishing a vibrant economic market. The implications of 
exactly what sort of freedom America spreads in stubborn reliance on coercive diplomacy and 
economic sanctions can be left to further interpretation. 
 For the same reasons, China became a leading sanctions buster with Iran, due to 
economic opportunity (not political or ideological wants), imports of fossil fuels and demand for 
export products and manufacturing. China, despite its reliance on a Marxist style command 
government, has engaged in economic diplomacy since the 1970s. China is an excellent example 
of a state willing and able to fill the trade vacuum left by American imposed sanctions. In the 
case of Iran, despite the political animosity, sanctions in the 1980s effectively removed the 
United States as a trade partner and opened the door for other states to fill the void. Even if 
sanctions succeed in achieving their political goals, the economic harm done to the sanction 
imposing state may reduce its reliance in the future. 
 Economic sanctions are rarely enforced within target states and third party sanctions 
busters. Economic interests often supersede political ones. Even where political interests align, 
as in the case of the U.A.E. over Iran, the economic fruit is just too sweet to pass up. Despite 
years of sanctions busting behavior and the loose economic policy that enabled it, Iran remains a 
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top strategic threat to the U.A.E. Thus, the strategic military alliance with the United States made 
sense, despite undermining the alliance through trade relationships to Iran. 
 In addition to local economic policy and the lack of federal enforcement, several global 
firms got into the act in busting sanctions. Even U.S. firms, like Halliburton, found the 
geographic proximity and lack of government oversight of Dubai attractive enough to move their 
headquarters there (Early 2015, 129). Dick Cheney and Halliburton circumvented the spirit of 
US sanctions on Iran by electing to operate outside of domestic U.S. scrutiny. As a CEO of a 
multinational corporation, Cheney was very critical of sanctions: “We should look upon the 
capacities and capabilities and the desire of American businesses to be involved around the 
world as a valuable asset and not as a club that we can use to punish those who disagree with 
policies of goals or objectives of the United States” (Singleton and Griswold 1999, 27-28). As 
Vice President in the Bush Administration, Cheney softened his stance on the use of economic 
sanctions. 
 The growth and importance of Dubai and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in the 
Middle East and global economy strengthened through the black market of busted sanctions set 
up with Iran. There was a belief in Dubai that U.S. “could not or would not punish sanction-
busting violations” or set up a ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ environment where everyone does it, yet no 
one admits it (Early 2015, 116). A Dubai trader was quoted as saying, “U.S. sanctions slowed 
things down and forced importers to use middlemen, so prices jumped some 30 percent, but they 
really did not stop much” (Early 2015, 117). This supports the economic theory that where 
demand exists, supply will fill it. Examples of desired American goods include: GE, HP, and 
American made PCs and servers. All of these products proved to be available, but at a higher 
price premium and procurement delay. For the American firm, outside looking in, it could have 
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resented the profit increases to middlemen and distribution networks, or taken on a policy of 
plausible deniability in that everyone wins. However, most corporations operate ‘for profit’ so 
eventually the strain to recover lost profits to satisfy market demand merely due to parent 
country foreign policy preferences would lead to a large scale lobbying effort or a clandestine 
reliance on redistribution. Externally, corporations could pressure their host governments 
regarding free trade and tax policy. Internally, they could consider relocating to a more 
commerce friendly environment, such as the Free Trade Zone established in Dubai. 
 This does not mean that the sanctioning government had no means of enforcement. Early 
(2015) supplies a list of products that the U.S. Department of Commerce prosecuted in attempts 
to curtail sanctions busting behavior. These include “fire alarm system equipment, gas turbine 
parts, bone densitometers, computer parts, [and] mini photo labs” (Early 2015, 118). The years 
of prosecution include 1995 to 2002, showing the U.S. government was well aware of sanction 
busting occurrences between Iran and the U.A.E. Like the trade in illegal narcotics, these 
prosecution efforts hampered but did not eliminate illicit activity.  
 To back up the claims of local traders, there was an extremely low rate of enforcement. 
As Early (2015, 121) found,  
sanctions busters operating in the UAE thus appear to have needed little subterfuge to obtain 
sensitive American products because the U.S. government failed to invest the necessary 
resources to identify, investigate, and punish most violations that took place in the country. 
Once American products arrived in Dubai they fell into a black hole as far as most U.S. 
companies and authorities were concerned.  
 
This lack of enforcement provided “automatic deniability” on behalf of firms more interested in 
the bottom line than diplomacy and foreign policy. Business interests have infiltrated the 
political sphere at the local and international level. Firms can afford to lobby for favorable 
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policy, exceptions to sanctions and trade restrictions, and generally undermine U.S. foreign 
policy interests due to the desire of maximizing profits. 
 But sanction busting can also carry unintended consequences. The most stunning 
example is the ability of the Khan proliferation network to operate within the free trade zone 
established in the U.A.E. This network was deemed responsible for Libya and most of Iran’s 
nuclear programs. Senator John Warner (Early 2015, 126) decried the impact of how the U.A.E. 
turning a blind eye to trade restrictions became a sore spot on U.S.-U.A.E. relations. Though the 
U.A.E. was of strategic military importance to U.S. interests, by setting up a favorable 
environment for weapons and nuclear proliferation trade, the U.A.E. became a security threat. 
The U.A.E. from 1995 to 2005 was seemingly in perfect position geographically, politically and 
economically. Iran needed U.A.E. economically more than it needed Iran. Likewise, the U.S. 
needed U.A.E. militarily more than it needed the U.S. By sanctions busting, the U.A.E. 
threatened the very military and economic security it came to realize through its partnerships.  
 The U.A.E. played a pivotal role in undermining U.S. sanctions on Iran in regards to its 
nuclear ambitions (Early 2015, 131). Libya was not in the same position as it capitulated to US 
pressures to eliminate its weapons program. Espionage and subversion complicated matters, 
impacting diplomacy and the likelihood of sanctions ending. The delivery and use of the Stuxnet 
virus, damaging nearly one thousand nuclear centrifuges in Natanz in 2010, could be seen as an 
act of war (Dunne et al. 2016, 231). Though never admitted to, the sabotage of Iranian nuclear 
centrifuges could have lasting implications and done irreparable harm to the political goals 
sought through sanctions. The infiltration of German systems engineering demonstrates the 
willingness of Siemens, a German firm, to supply Iranian centrifuges despite policy 
disagreements between the two governments. Germany was later instrumental in achieving a ten 
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year ban from Iran in the nuclear agreement. Espionage and subterfuge therefore can undermine 
the success of sanctions and diplomacy. 
 The implementation of U.S. sanctions in 2006 increased reputation costs for countries to 
provide cover to firms engaging in sanctions busting (Early 2015, 132). The United States began 
a series of policy reforms intended to place domestic pressure on firms that shirked sanction 
regimes. The new U.S. Department of Energy designated “destinations of diversion concerns” 
applied to the U.A.E., and gave new scrutiny to countries providing ‘pass through’ services to 
products of restricted trade. The U.A.E. government signed a civilian nuclear assistance 
agreement in 2009 – and was directly pressured to limit proliferation trade (Early 2015, 134). In 
addition to diplomatic efforts through the Department of State, the U.S. Department of Treasury 
acted as a deterrent to U.A.E. banks by punishments meted out on other financial institutions that 
ignored rules against Iran. Since 2007, the U.A.E. government has greater enforced policies of 
sanction compliance.  
 More importantly, the U.S. influenced NATO partners to halt dual use exports to Cuba. 
Perhaps targeted sanctions work in restriction of goods or technology as opposed to demanding a 
more comprehensive ban on all trade with a target state. The increase of pressure through 
alliance channels gives credence to the positive effects of sanctions. This presents a use of 
sanctions as signaling. Sanctions can be a way to offer a united front short of military action. The 
United States sought European Union and U.A.E. cooperation on imposed sanctions, even if they 
did not fully support U.S. policy (Early 2015, 138). 
 Despite the presence of sanctions busting throughout U.S.-Iran sanctions, sanctions were 
ultimately seen as a success in facilitating the P5 plus one agreement with Iran. However, Early 
(2015, 141) describes Iran success an “anomalous rather than archetypal case.” The shared goal 
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of nuclear non-proliferation brought more pressure to the table from E.U. members that might 
not support U.S. sanctions methods, but they appreciated the sought after results. Iran’s history 
of shirking world economic and military domination can be realized in the controversial decision 
to alter the gauge of its train tracks to non-standard tolerances. Iran has delighted in being a 
political rogue, yet what is celebrated as free expression in one nation is often characterized as 
non-compliance to international norms in another. This hardly seems the egalitarian worldview 
most liberal internationalists profess to uphold. 
 Bryan Early (2015) appears to hedge his bets on the possibility that a full breadth of 
research may refute some or all of his claims. However, his theory appears roughly based on an 
old one: that states will generally do what is in their salient political or economic best interests. 
This is true of military action, political diplomacy, and alliance building. States do as they wish. 
Early (2015) merely applies Thucididean logic to a modern process of how states deal with and 
attempt to coerce one another into action. There lies a touch of pragmatism in states following 
economic interest or domestic commercial interest over their own foreign policy goals (a.k.a. 
lobbying). States want the economic and political benefits of maintaining credibility with source 
nations, yet if states or firms within states find they can also profit by ignoring imposed 
sanctions, they will do so. This was most evident in the case study of U.A.E., where politically it 
agreed with the U.S. sanctions regarding the security threat created by Iran, yet economically the 
U.A.E. benefitted by undercutting sanctions. 
 Early offers the following hypotheses: “In responding to U.S.-imposed sanctions, the 
states best equipped to provide substitute markets to targets are apt to be large, well-developed 
economies” (Early 2015, 68). It is less likely that the economically and politically disadvantaged 
states will rush to the assistance of their less fortunate, targeted neighbors. But rich economies 
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seeking an edge or a new source of revenue may willingly fill the vacuum of halted legitimate 
trade in the wake of imposed economic sanctions. In addition to supposing the size of the 
economy leads to the propensity to bust sanctions, the author asserts that openness of a state’s 
economy increases their likelihood to bust sanctions. Commercial dependence on a target state 
assists third party states in sanctions busting. Geographic proximity also greatly influences states 
in the opportunity to bust sanctions – an economic opportunity sometimes too tempting to pass 
up. Early concludes:“The U.A.E.’s proximity to Iran, the commercial openness of its port city of 
Dubai, and the close commercial ties that the emirate had to Iran all facilitated in the 
development of an extensive sanctions busting relationship between the two countries” (Early 
2015, 112). These pressures represent reasons to avoid use of sanctions, particularly if states lack 
the ability to enforce or manage sanctions compliance. 
 Imposed sanctions carry other unintended consequences. Peter Andreas (2005) identifies 
transnational criminal networks and connects their creation to sanction episodes. An awareness 
of the detrimental impacts of economic policy causes examination of the true lasting effects of 
sanctions. In the case of Yugoslavia, Albania profited for criminal smuggling networks in the 
wake of sanctions. Yet once sanctions were lifted, the economy reliant on the profits of sanctions 
busting were ill equipped to survive when other options presented themselves. Transnational 
criminal networks provide temporary relief yet do not lead to lasting regional economic 
dominance.  
 If sanctions continually produce lawlessness and weaken diplomacy as states lie for their 
firms, are they worth it? The propensity of neighboring states who engage in sanction busting to 
underreport illicit trade severely limits the ability of pure quantitative analyses. Much of the 
research is legitimately hampered by the lack of data on illicit trade. Ballooning black market 
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trade that is misreported or underreported makes it more difficult to fully analyze the impact of 
economic sanctions (Early 2015, 78). 
 Sanctions can also provide political entanglements for neighboring states. Weak 
neighbors may agree with the goals of the sanctioning state, yet be in a position where they 
cannot refuse to engage in sanctions busting due to political or economic pressure. South Africa 
opted for trade-based sanction busting with Rhodesia which provided some political cover – 
despite the state ideologically supporting Rhodesia government (Early 2015, 83). States also may 
engage in sanctions busting to make a political statement, even at significant cost to their own 
domestic economies. Under an imposed Soviet blockade, the Berlin airlift signaled U.S. resolve 
(Early 2015, 85). There is political value in sanctions resistance. 
 For trade-based busting, Early (2015) uses the example of the United Arab Emirates in 
busting United States sanctions on Iran. Aid-based sanction busting involves states with political 
incentives to undermine the goals of the sanctioning state. The most common example is the 
Soviet Union’s economic aid to Cuba during the Cold War. Aid based busting has an economic 
disincentive, as it often costs the third party state to engage in sanctions busting. However, the 
political costs of non-action are seen as higher, particularly in the hegemonic tug-of-war engaged 
in by the two competing superpowers in the Cold War. 
 Even when political and ideological reasons exist to support a targeted state, third party 
states have an economic interest to engage in trade based busting (black market or loose customs 
enforcement or fraud) over foreign aid (direct financing that may not have a return on 
investment). Thus, Bryan Early (2015, 57) finds examples of aid based sanctions busting to be 
the exception rather than the rule: “As such, instances in which third party governments bankroll 
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robust efforts to assist target states in defeating sanctions are relatively rare in comparison to 
trade-based sanctions busting.” 
 There are many theoretical implications of a culture of sanction busting. The U.S. 
principle of rugged individualism still persists in current political culture – that it is a patriotic act 
to reject the consensus of world leaders. The prevalence of rugged individualism, self-
determination of nations, and strong reliance on laissez faire economic policy within United 
States history ought to discourage the use of sanctions, particularly when presented with a less 
adversarial world after the end of the Cold War. With the rise of nationalist movements in the 
United States and Europe, it is unlikely that resistance to a majority global consensus will ever 
completely disappear from the political lexicon. Charismatic dictators can use imposed sanctions 
as proof that the world is against them, strengthening their power over their vulnerable 
populations. Not only can a charismatic leader gain domestic political leverage from resistance to 
sanctions, food shortages and economic ills can be blamed on the world order. 
 A surprising discovery in Early’s (2015, 144) study is just who is more likely to emerge 
as sanctions busters: “What’s notable is that all of the leading sanctions busters are democratic 
U.S. allies that possessed large economies and were heavily engaged in international trade.” His 
statistical model backs this up as West Germany and Japan far outstrip the Soviet Union/Russia 
in the numerical impact of sanctions busting episodes. Perhaps the Soviet Union intervened in 
instances of more strategic value. Regardless, the greatest threat to the influence of U.S. foreign 
policy success in relation to economic sanctions rested in the actions of allies, not adversaries. 
The theory centers around the prospect that economic factors, such as the demand created by 
limiting trade of specific goods, can lead to smuggling, profiteering and the establishment of 
criminal networks. Some of these networks exist in the form of multi-national corporations that 
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have significant political clout even with sanctioning countries. In most cases, the incentive to 
support or at least condone the illicit economic actions is stronger than the enforcement power or 
resolve behind the sanctioning effort. 
 Sanctions busting can be state sanctioned or less formal. Transshipments routed through 
less hostile neighbors can positively affect a state’s GDP. Dodging the eye of regulators and 
customs agents is nothing new. Criminal networks and sophisticated smuggling operations can 
be established with or without government consent of knowledge. However, a targeted regime 
that is aware of the criminal operations can use existing networks to reward supporters, just as 
sanctions are targeted to individually pressure those same supporters. 
 Early (2015) finds longevity to be a leading influence in the likelihood of sanctions 
failure. The longer U.S. sanctions take place, the more likely a state will bust them. For example, 
Iran’s economy in 1979 was heavily dependent on U.S. goods. The removal of the United States 
as a trade partner had an immediate effect on Iran’s political decision making. However, as U.S. 
sanctions lasted into the 1980s and 1990s, Iran was forced to fill the economic vacuum left by 
the withdrawal of U.S. firms. Despite the passage of time, demand remains and other trading 
partners are sought out – some legally, some illegally. Early (2015, 153) finds multiple factors 
overlapping due to “commercial, political and geographic relationship” of target and third party 
state matter in likelihood of sanction busting. The U.A.E. became a likely candidate to sanctions 
bust on Iran’s behalf due to its proximity, but Iran first needed the demand and the ability to 
satisfy it by any means necessary. 
 Early (2015) provides three key indicators: large economies, extensively involved in 
international trade, and democratic governance. Of these, democratic governance tends to be 
least important. However, the ability to replace the U.S. role as a commercial provider presents a 
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likely sanctions buster even if that state is aligned politically with the United States (Early 2015, 
154). The demand offered by a prior U.S. economic relationship is a vacuum that is often filled. 
Economic pressure appears to supersede political pressure. 
Aid-Based Sanctions Busting: the Case of Cuba 
 Regarding aid-based sanctions busting, Early’s (2015) principle study challenges the 
Cold War notion that America’s adversaries will do whatever it takes to subvert U.S. foreign 
policy. True, the Soviet Union was willing to bear the economic burden of supporting Cuba. But 
once this effort failed, the ideological similar Chinese agreed to send aid, but only if Cuba used 
that aid to purchase Chinese goods: “Consistent with the overarching theory, the Castro regime 
appears to have leveraged both trade-based and aid-based sanctions busting in its efforts to resist 
the U.S. sanctions” (Early 2015, 159). Aid-based sanction busting takes place when the 
following three conditions are met: salient political interest, market-based trade infeasible, and 
when the third party state can afford it. In the case of Cuba, the Cold War aid provided by the 
Soviet Union and China clearly fell into this category. However, in the post-Cold War period 
Venezuela and China increasingly demanded an economic component to the aid China was 
willing to provide, thus falling more in line with trade based sanction busting or at least a hybrid 
of the two. 
 In combating sanctions busting, the United States increasingly relied on 
intergovernmental bodies with regional clout, such as the Organization of American States, to 
help support sanctioning efforts (Early 2015, 163). As already mentioned, the United States 
enlisted support from the European Union and NATO allies to support its sanctioning efforts on 
Iran. The U.S. successfully pressured American multi-national corporations not to bust sanctions 
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in regards to Cuba. The greater the regional influence that can be applied, the greater the 
likelihood of success of imposed sanctions. 
 The combination of these actions left few choices for Castro to replace the United States 
as a trade partner with any nation other than the Soviet Union (Early 2015, 166-167). From 1961 
to 1973, Cuba conducted 73% of trade with communist states, 48% with U.S.S.R. Firms in Great 
Britain, Japan and Spain profited highly from premiums of Cuban trade, supporting the argument 
that democratic allies are often more likely to bust sanctions (Early 2015, 169). Initial Soviet 
help was perhaps more beneficial to the U.S.S.R. than to Cuba. That is, until Castro learned to 
play the Soviets to his advantage. Ultimately, Cuba may have benefitted more from establishing 
regional economic alliances that would last through the Cold War period of political animosity. 
When the Soviet economy could no longer support Cuban aid, that aid was withdrawn. Cuba was 
left stranded in a bipolar world economy without a dance partner. The example of Cuba supports 
the idea that sanctions merely determine winners and losers in global trade. Although premium 
profits are generally enjoyed by sanctions busters over the target state, Castro found ways to 
circumvent the prevailing standard (Early 2015, 172). 
 Cuba was indeed an anomaly. Unless that target state leader is savvy, like Castro, to take 
advantage of politically charged animosities, the example it provides is quite unlikely to add to 
the depth of research. Soviet animosity led to self-funded subsidies on sugar, for instance paying 
ten times the world prices. Cuba under Castro was known to purchase foreign sugar, and then 
sell it to the U.S.S.R. at the friendly rates given to its domestically produced sugar. Likewise, the 
great discount on Soviet oil, which Cuba re-exported at a great profit, ensured Cuba was truly 
benefitting from the imposition of sanctions. In 1986, Cuba’s oil exports were greater than sugar 
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(Early 2015, 174-175). Like other examples of sanctions busters in U.A.E. and Albania, Cuba 
took advantage of favorable political variables to benefit economically. 
 The Soviet Union lacked “motives and the means” to continue support even before 
dissolution (Early 2015, 178). In 1990-1991, the Soviet government for the first time proposed a 
one year plan, not a five year plan. Cuba presented a sort of reverse imperialism, where a third 
world state was taking advantage of a first world political motive to benefit itself in the global 
marketplace. Favored status with the Soviet Union ensured Cuba access to other Eastern 
European markets. China stopped providing foreign aid in 1966 due to a political rift with the 
Soviets (still some trade). Ultimately, the Sino-Soviet rift led to China (exporting primarily rice) 
backing out in favor of the U.S.S.R. (exporting favorably priced oil) in Cuba’s sphere of 
influence. When China later reemerged as a trade partner with Cuba, it prioritized tits own 
economic self-interest, required aid to be tied to the purchase of other Chinese commodities. Not 
content with mere aid-based assistance, China required Cuba to boost its domestic economy 
through a series of strings attached. In the case of Soviet Russia, the regime was more than 
content to foot the bill for sanction busting in order to antagonize the United States, which 
originated the sanctions. Furthering the evidence that the aid was politically motivated, the 
Soviet Union did not support the Castro regime until after 1961 when Castro declared Cuba was 
engaged in a Marxist revolution (Early 2015, 172). 
 The ultimate goal of U.S. sanctions was regime change, determining immediately they 
would be less likely to work. Despite the opening of relations to post-Soviet Russia and former 
Eastern bloc nations, the United States doubled down on isolating Cuba from its markets in the 
early 1990s. But as the U.S. tightened trade restrictions on its allies, it provoked U.N. 
condemnation of U.S. sanctioning efforts. Canada, the E.U., and Japan were not enthusiastic 
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about U.S. trade restrictions in a post-Cold War world. The United States passed the 1996 
Helms-Burton Act, a measure that cracked down on third party trade with Cuba (Early 2015, 
184). The United States risked angering third party states by sanctions enforcement. Helms-
Burton was criticized and rejected by even the closest U.S. allies. 
 The Soviet withdrawal of aid and economic subsidies left Cuba on the verge of collapse. 
Castro pursued a series of economic reforms in 1990s – with various successes and failures. 
Castro began to cultivate trade relationships with China and Venezuela as new sanctions busters. 
China was allowed secrecy over post-Cold War foreign aid, which came in the form of interest 
free loans and technical assistance (Early 2015, 192). The Chinese entry was one of mixed 
political and commercial motives, as Chinese backed loans stipulated how much must be used to 
purchase Chinese goods and products. China also employed this hybrid strategy with North 
Korea, to varying degrees of success (Early 2015, 194). Castro also cultivated a trade 
relationship with Venezuela. 
 By 2005, Venezuela’s Chavez was the leading Cuban benefactor, providing “$1.7 billion 
worth of yearly oil concessions” (Early 2015, 196). Also provided were favorable interest rates, 
over fifty thousand barrels of oil per day to Cuban refinery, and Venezuela floating of credit and 
leniency for late payments. In exchange, Castro provided services in the form of technical 
assistance as well as thousands of “Cuban doctors, educators and coaches” (Early 2015, 197). 
The number of barrels of oil traded increased to over one hundred thousand per day in the latter 
years of Chavez’ reign. Although the favorable relationship given Cuba often caused domestic 
political strain, Maduro continued Chavez policy. Maduro’s ultimate ability to afford it 
financially and politically was highly suspect. 
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 One thing the Cuban example shows is that the U.S. government was essentially 
powerless to prevent sanction busting by allies and adversaries (Early 2015, 205). Post-Cold War 
China set up an aid based and trade based hybrid for Cuba and North Korea – merely having one 
benefactor would not be enough to self-sustain or prop up each regime (Early 2015, 209-210).  
ISS Roundtable: A Criticism of Bryan Early’s Approach 
 The response to Early’s (2015) work was critical in nature. Susan Allen (2017) charged 
that Early does not state whether governments actively or passively set conditions for sanctions 
busting and therefore should have greater responsibility for their success. Perhaps this varies 
from case to case. The United Arab Emirates provided a laissez-faire weak government model 
that was taken advantage of by economic interests, to its own profit. Allen (2017) is critical of 
Early’s U.A.E. description, particularly in the assessment of fault. What specifically did the 
U.A.E. government do? Was the creation of free economic zones contrary to the implementation 
of sanctions and thus run counter to the alliance and security pact shared with the United States? 
Did the U.A.E. misrepresent itself? Was the condoning policy that enabled sanctions busting a 
violation of treaty or international norm? And which entity should seek recompense – the sender 
state or the international community?  
 Early’s book (2015) invites further exploration of sanctions busting at the firm level not 
state level for policy making, especially if a majority of sanction busting firms are U.S. owned. 
Navin Bapat (2017) gives a policy recommendation to pursue multilateral not unilateral 
sanctions (Early 2015, 215). He ties success in multilateral sanctions in the data set as 51% 
success compared to 31% success in unilateral sanctions. Overall, he applauds the use of 
sanctions due to the low bar of avoiding military conflict. Bapat (2017) also thanks Early (2015) 
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for pointing out a potential challenge for policymakers, and proposes future research into what 
steps or strategies can be pursued to avoid sanctions busting. 
 Eric Lorber (2017) presents his refute as a policymaker, not an academic. He agrees with 
Early of the need for research to keep pace with policy changes. New approaches include 
restrictions on financial markets (U.S. and E.U.), debt financing, and energy technological 
advances (oil extraction). However, in place of ‘might makes right’ there is a world where those 
with “technological superiority and attractive capital markets” set the rules/norms of state 
behavior (even operating outside U.N. ideal of one state – one vote rules) – Russia (debt 
financing) and Iran (markets). Lorber (2017) describes the oversimplification of relationship 
between sanction busting private sector and government enforcement capability. Early’s (2015) 
qualitative and quantitative analysis does not seem to fully grasp at a state’s ability to 
legitimately restrict sanctions busting. Lorber (2017) gives an important caveat to his own 
critique: post 2002 lack of data and the difficulty of pulling trade from financial market activity. 
Again, there seems to be consensus on the need for more comprehensive research. 
 Mark Souva (2017) discusses why sanctions fail. He asserts that the imposition of 
economic sanctions could in actuality be an unintended signal that the state lacks resolve to use 
military force. The fact that many sanctions episodes involve compliments to military action 
makes this parsing a difficult maneuver. Finally, there remains an omitted question: what 
constitutes success? If busting is likely, are sanctions worthwhile? 
 Bryan Early (2017) agrees with his critics that many of the questions they pose stem from 
the dearth of adequate research. Early (2017) asserts that parsing over unilateral versus 
multilateral sanctions—particularly when multilateral is simply the United States plus one—
belies the likelihood of sanctions success tied to acceptance by third party states of the target. 
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Early agrees with Lorber (2017) that recent U.S. sanctions policy, especially in regards to Iran, 
appear to be better suited to achieving success. However, Early (2017, 12) does not see 
“financial sanctions as an effective strategy,” using E.U. failed attempts to block the Russian 
annexation of Crimea. He also questions whether firms or governments are ultimately 
responsible for sanctions busting: “My theory argues that profit-seeking firms are the drivers of 
which states become trade-based sanctions busters” (Maddux 2017, 13). 
 Early (2017) thanks the contributors to the roundtable for shedding light on questions not 
yet addressed in the literature. Future research and theoretical inquiry can only seemingly help 
the field of academic study. Early found that by just having one trade based buster significantly 
reduces likelihood of sanctions success. Having more than one all but guarantees failure (Early 
2015, 210). The U.S. sanctions busting and lack of effective enforcement against allies and 
adversaries provides a ‘best example theory confirmation’. Early’s (2017) advice to U.S. policy 
makers is a call for consistent enforcement; otherwise sanction busting emerges as an exercise in 
cost benefit analysis. 
 Like Peter Andreas (2005), Bryan Early (2015) suggests future research on the effects of 
economic sanctions on neighboring and third party states. There exists a significant gap in the 
research on how sanctions affect regions, not just the sanctioned state. Ultimately, the impact of 
Early’s study (2015) will best be realized when the questions posed are thoughtfully considered 
and valued by policy makers prior to initiating or perpetuating various sanctions episodes. Both 
authors present a caveat to the use of economic sanctions. Future sanction regimes ought to heed 




Chapter 5: Case Studies 
 
 To fully realize the impact of economic sanctions, an examination of several case studies 
is appropriate. The research makes clear the importance of past sanction episodes on future 
policy decisions. The ultimate success of sanction episodes should be judged based on levels of 
effectiveness, such as achieving intended result(s), avoiding unintended consequences, and the 
long-term stability of targeted state. This analysis will be applied to sanctions in the 1990s in 
Haiti, Iraq, and former Yugoslavia. These cases were selected due to the ability to assess lasting 
effects. Also included is a brief examination of recent sanctions on Iran and North Korea, which 
present excellent candidates for future research. 
Haiti: The Dark Side of Globalization 
 Haiti was placed under regional comprehensive sanctions in the early 1990s, after a 
military coup overthrew the democratically elected Aristide government. Although the regime 
was publicly supported, there were doubts as to the effectiveness of government services 
rendered to the populace in need. Initial sanctions were imposed by the United States and the 
Organization of American States (OAS). The United Nations backed the sanctions efforts, and 
later approved the use of military force to stabilize the country. Unfortunately the impact of 
imposed international sanctions effectively halted the Haitian economy and denied the people 
basic humanitarian needs. Haiti was tied to international trade and supply – a blockade of major 
cities and the capitol Port au Prince severely hampered the economy. Haiti was not set up as a 
self-sustaining economy. The halt on port entry threatened internal distribution networks and 
strengthened military rule as the people depended solely on the military for supply of needed 
goods, including humanitarian aid.  
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 Haiti was historically conditioned to governing by brutal elites. There existed an 
established ‘winner-take-all’ political culture. Mistrust in institutions was historically significant. 
Corruption was entrenched and instilled from without and within. Dempsey and Fontaine (2001, 
3) found that “when the U.S. government departed Haiti in 1934, according to one Haitian 
historian, it left ‘some good roads and a few schools, but little democracy.’ It also left a U.S.-
trained paramilitary that brutalized the Haitian people and dominated Haitian politics for several 
decades to come.” It appears the Haitian aversion to any foreign intervention, economic or 
otherwise, has historical roots beyond the casting off of imperialist chains. Therefore, the 
imposition of economic sanctions on a country long known to reject international influence—
whether from France, the United States or the United Nations—was practically doomed to 
failure. As in many sanctions cases, the sanction regime provided a greater enemy for corrupt 
governing officials to point to as the source of economic hardship. 
 Most research concedes that Haiti’s problems of a weak economy and limited trade 
networks were not caused by sanctions; rather, sanctions simply exacerbated a poor economic 
infrastructure that was already there. However, the negative effects of having the world blockade 
a country and stand opposed to sending help perhaps set domestic trust levels (already weak) to 
an all-time low. Humanitarian military presence subject to a quick draw-down also signaled the 
Haitian poor to their importance on a global stage. The internationally supported Haitian 
governing regime showed an inability or unwillingness to ask for international assistance, if that 
assistance merely came in the form of military action or strengthening existing channels of 
oppression. Domestic political and social rivalries exacerbated a tenuous situation, where aid 
workers faced difficulties both externally and internally. 
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 Starting from a position of relative economic poverty did not help matters. Despite 
democratically elected leaders, civil unrest reflected the hopelessness endemic in Haiti’s 
economic situation: “When Jean Baptiste Aristide became President in February 1991, one half 
of the labor force was unemployed, one half of all adults could not read, one fifth of all children 
had never attended school, and one third of the population lacked access to modern health 
services” (Gibbons and Garfield 1999, 1499). Many Haitians worked for low pay in the garment, 
electronics, sports or toy assembly industries. The average worker supported six dependents. The 
boycott of these industries led to the loss of income for a quarter of a million residents. The 
closing of factories affected service industry jobs as well, including meals and other services. 
Unemployed urban poor flocked to rural support networks, willing to work for less wages and 
increasing demand of food that used to be directed to the cities. As demand for exports 
plummeted, eliminating income from steady jobs in this sector, imported goods were more 
expensive, including the price of oil. Higher oil prices strained trucking supply networks to get 
agricultural products to the capital, Port-au-Prince, where 30% of the population resided. Even 
worse, early humanitarian aid vessels were turned out of port due to inefficient and corrupt 
internal receivers. 
The embargo on imported kerosene led to a dramatic rise in charcoal consumption – the 
production of charcoal a key contributor to deforestation. Unemployed urban poor moved in with 
rural relatives. Overcrowding and the lack of provided services were experienced in rural and 
urban areas. Haitians sold possessions and assets to survive; for example, the number of 
households with televisions went from 42% to 11% in one small city (Gibbons and Garfield 
1999, 1500). Worse, Haiti’s own government inefficiencies and mismanagement worked against 
the basic needs of the people: “Supply problems stemming from the embargo were compounded 
57 
 
by political repression, resulting in less-active committees and reduced maintenance” (Gibbons 
and Garfield 1999, 1501). The majority of water facilities were in disrepair. Garbage piled up in 
the city streets. Those in positions of power did not accept the responsibility of serving the 
people’s basic needs. 
Through all of this, Haiti became an example of the unintended consequences of 
sanctions. In a world envisioning greater cooperation among liberal nations, little thought is 
given to those under punishment or banishment from the world economic order. Haiti provided a 
crucial manufacturing and production hub to an emerging global economy. But its importance 
mattered much more to Haiti itself than to the world. Haiti needed the world more than the world 
needed Haiti’s meager contribution. Plenty of countries exist with cheap labor and spotty capital 
improvements. By the logic of economic sanctions, Haiti would seemingly make a perfect 
candidate for eventual success, as one day of the embargo would surely lead to decisive action to 
return the country to normalcy. Unfortunately, repressive regimes are not quick to yield power 
for the benefit of the objects of their repression. And Haitians culturally were less prone to 
accept assistance or decisions made by international actors on their behalf. 
Still, Haiti managed to avoid complete catastrophe through its period of sanctions. In 
spite of government corruption and ineptitude, “widespread famine was avoided, epidemics were 
contained, and at least minimal social services were maintained. These were important 
achievements. Although a humanitarian disaster was averted, economic decline and social 
dislocation were not.” (Gibbons and Garfield 1999, 1502) The move to rural areas, adding to the 
average number of dependents per household, changed demand for services and food. The 
service industry could not keep up. Many of the rural poor walked miles to obtain clean water, or 
went without. This caused a strain on health infrastructure. But the greatest blow was the 
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inability to compete or even participate in the global marketplace, which had far reaching effects 
to Haiti’s political health and well-being: “In reducing educational and health opportunities, 
sanctions also reduced Haiti’s ability to participate in the global economy and to subsequently 
stabilize and develop into a democracy” (Gibbons and Garfield 1999, 1502).  
Were sanctions effective in Haiti? Haiti is often referenced for the humanitarian costs of 
imposed sanctions. Although a humanitarian disaster was averted, unintended costs to 
democratic stability and economic progress were great. Another round of sanctions was imposed 
just a decade later, again due to political instability and democratic subversion. The case of Haiti 
should be analyzed for the economic ramifications of what happens when a state is expelled from 
the world economy. Despite political rehabilitation, lost economic market share left Haiti in a 
precarious position. Political instability, poverty and internal corruption lasted well beyond the 
sanctions regime. Although sanctions assisted in restoring a democratic leader, the sanctions 
episode did not leave Haiti in better position to avoid such a disruption in the future. 
Iraq: Economic Siegecraft 
Iraq represents a case of inflicting economic damage while maintaining humanitarian 
stability. In regards to the effects on GDP in the era of sanctions, Hufbauer et al. (2011) note that 
sanctions prior to 1985 averaged 1.5% GDP while post 1985 (excluding Iraq) averaged 3.3% 
(Hufbauer et al. 2011, 105). Iraq was not new to the position of international ‘other’. It was 
possibly branded a ‘rogue state’ as far back as the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, but at least by the 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The global unity in condemning Iraq’s invasion of its southern 
neighbor signified a new era of multilateral military cooperation. Most nations took part in the 
U.S. led, U.N. sanctioned liberation of Kuwait. Likewise, most nations supported the 
comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq in the mid to late 1990s. 
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Sanctions on Iraq still brought humanitarian damage, particularly harsh on a country 
recovering from war. Yousif (2013, 12) considered, “the devastatingly tight economic sanctions 
regime that followed [the 1990-1991 Gulf War] kept the country from rebuilding. Infant 
mortality and malnutrition soared, inflation wiped out middle class savings and incomes 
collapsed.” Again, the detrimental impact of economic sanctions increased under the thumb of a 
repressive ruler who relied on military strength over securing the will of the people. As if 
learning from the crisis in Haiti, steps were taken to avoid an outright humanitarian crisis. Early 
in the sanction regime, the United Nations established a system of oil for food, though the 
amount allowed paled in comparison to the needs the Iraqi economy had. As early as July 1991, 
“a UN interagency humanitarian mission to Iraq…recommended that Iraq be permitted to resume 
limited oil sales to finance urgently needed humanitarian supplies” (Fine 1992, 36). Smuggling 
networks were created, but to the benefit of neighbors like U.A.E. rather than the Iraqi economy; 
Yousif (2013, 10) notes, “from 1990 to 2003, Iraq languished under comprehensive UN 
sanctions that prohibited foreign trade.” As in Haiti, removal from the world economy may have 
been the most lasting effect. 
In the years since the decade of economic sanctions, Iraq has not resumed prominence in 
regional trade. Despite removal of an oppressive regime, restoration of democratic structure, and 
military stabilization, Iraq has not experienced the booming economy experienced across the 
region. As in Haiti, there were multiple reasons for the malaise: “Critics note the endemic 
corruption, elevated poverty rates, continuing insecurity, bureaucratic wrangling and poor public 
services that still characterize economic life today, ten years after the removal of sanctions” 
(Yousif 2013, 10). In recent years, the rise of ISIS, the slow rebuilding of infrastructure and the 
continued marginalization of Iraq in the world economy all kept Iraq as a global ‘have-not’. 
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Further instability from the ruling regime leaves little faith that, post-sanctions, Iraq will return to 
a position of regional health, let alone dominance.  
The marginalization of Iraq received the backing of the general global consensus. 
Alnasrawi (2001, 208) notes, “UNSC Resolution 661…and subsequent sanctions resolutions 
created a set of conditions which virtually cut Iraq off from the world economy.” In effect, the 
United Nations, a bastion of liberal internationalism, was signaling world actors that the 
emerging global economy was a privilege not a right. For those rogue regimes and bad actors 
that resist prevailing international norms, the global economy could be an exclusive club from 
which one could be expelled. This stigmatization ultimately provides a world of winners and 
losers and heroes and villains, which is contrary to the competitive cooperation that truly 
surrounds liberal internationalism. These lasting effects of the use of sanctions ought to lead the 
international community to reconsider acceptable coercive action. 
Critics claim the U.N. quick to punish and slow to correct: “It was not until April 1995 
that the UNSC decided to revisit the issue of sanctions when it adopted Resolution 986 allowing 
Iraq to sell $2 billion-worth of oil every six months to provide funding…and to help Iraq 
purchase food and medicine” (Alnasrawi 2001, 212). The impact of the U.N. bombing in the 
1990-1991 Gulf War left Iraq crippled in energy, transportation and general infrastructure. As 
the Iraqi economy relied on oil production and sales, the embargoes and restrictions on Iraqi oil 
removed a viable source of income for the rebuilding system of infrastructure. Corruption was 
rampant in the system: “In April 2004, the U.S. General Accountability Office, the investigative 
arm of the U.S. Congress, calculated that Iraq illegally earned over $10 billion from oil 
smuggling and the systematic extortion of kickbacks from firms trading with Iraq through the 
U.N.’s Oil for Food Program between 1997 and 2002” (Andreas 2005, 353). The international 
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community was slow to realize and even slower to provide lasting changes to a sanctions policy 
that expressed displeasure yet accounted for the humanitarian needs of the war torn state. Iraq 
relied on food imports to survive. The inability to import without U.N. permission and 
supervision and the difficulty in distribution served the purpose of showing every Iraqi citizen 
exactly where he or she ranks in the world community. Economic recovery was nearly 
impossible as long as sanctions remained in place due to the nature of Iraqi reliance on oil 
exports, food imports, and foreign debt and access to financial markets. 
Despite providing a source of illicit gain, the economic benefit from the humanitarian 
exemption did not put Iraq on the road to recovery. Alnasrawi (2001, 213) is critical of the 
lasting impact of sanctions: “As to the impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme, its contribution to 
the well-being of the people of Iraq has been minimal in that it failed to reverse the deterioration 
in the social and economic conditions of the country.” As in Haiti, the distribution and proper 
storage of food and medicines was negatively affected by a spotty infrastructure. The Iraqi 
population was devastated: “Estimates of the number of people who lost their lives because of 
the sanctions range up to 1.5 million people, including more than 500,000 children. The World 
Health Organisation concluded that the health system had been set back by some 50 years” 
(Alnasrawi 2001, 214). Sanctions truly hurt—particularly the poor and disadvantaged. 
 As Iraq emerged from the devastation of war and sanctions, some reconstruction of its 
local economy was helped by a rapidly expanding public sector. Over 40% of the Iraqi labor 
force works in public sector jobs, helping reduce unemployment from 38 percent to 20 percent in 
2013 and raised average incomes (Yousif 2013, 12). But with government revenues tied to the 
export dollars of Iraqi oil, where price fluctuates and an international consortium (OPEC) 
determines supply, domestic policy can merely serve as a redistribution vessel for revenues Iraq 
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is under no guarantee to receive. The one thing Iraq cannot afford is additional military conflict, 
domestic or foreign, that threatens an already shaky infrastructure. Iraq is fully dependent on 
world power brokers, both regionally in OPEC and internationally in the United Nations sanction 
regimes, to survive. Iraq has no choice but to stay, as best as it can, in the good graces of 
prevailing regional and world hegemons. The health of the economy and the survival of its 
people depend on it. 
 In this case, sanctions imposed did not lead to regime change or even behavioral change. 
Most of the talk on WMDs was to solidify political power for the Hussein regime. Shaking a fist 
at U.N. weapons inspectors was a way to earn sympathy from the Iraqi people and establish the 
threat of the world order upon their very livelihood. Any reports of lack of food or starvation 
supported the narrative that the world was against them. Seeing other Gulf nations grow rich on 
oil reserves merely exacerbated the political impact utilized by bad governance domestically. 
The existence of military intervention, both in the early 1990s and in 2003, makes ill effects of 
sanctions difficult to study. It is nearly impossible to separate the impact on economy and 
services due to military activity as opposed to targeted or comprehensive sanctions. Most 
countries choose to allocate resources differently in warfare than in times of peace. The 
destruction of transportation and energy infrastructure from both military engagements affected 
Iraq’s ability to provide government services to its people, regardless of sanctions. Restrictions 
on trade, lack of access to financial markets, and determination as a world ‘bad actor’ merely 
compounded the struggle to recover economically from protracted war. 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia: Promoting Bad Behavior by Punishing Bad Behavior 
 Comprehensive sanctions were placed on the Former Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro over their involvement in sectarian violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These 
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sanctions were established by the United Nations in 1992 and lasted nearly a decade. 
Humanitarian exemptions existed, but the bureaucratic inefficiency of submitting requests even 
for medicine and humanitarian aid encouraged the use of back channels and smuggling networks. 
Yugoslavia was in a much better position to endure the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, as it 
produced the majority of its own food. However, the ruling Serbian regime under Milosevic, 
already targeted due to policies favorable to ethnic cleansing, could not be relied on to ensure 
medicines and food equitably distributed.  
 Sanctions brought additional problems. As Andreas (2005) notes, “sanctions did, 
however, greatly exacerbate the economic crisis and, equally important, gave the Milosevic 
regime a convenient external source to blame for the growing economic hardship—even as those 
close to the regime were becoming rich from war profiteering and sanctions evasion” (Andreas 
2005, 341). The ruling authority made sure the people felt the brunt of sanctions, in an attempt to 
cultivate nationalist sentiment by showing the world was against them. Garfield (2001) found 
that the ability to ship goods had an effect on the population: “Though humanitarian goods were 
exempted in principle, economic sanctions limited their availability” (Garfield 2001, 580). When 
a corrupt regime controls internal distribution networks, even humanitarian aid is scarce to those 
on the political outs. Yet many rural areas were self sustaining in food production, unlike the 
cases above. Iraq depended on foreign imports for food, while sanctions in Haiti caused greater 
strain on natural resources due to charcoal production as a heating substitute. 
 The ability to produce its own food, coupled with the Cold War experience of resisting 
foreign pressures, produced in Yugoslavia a rather interesting dynamic. The Serbian people 
embraced the role of outcast and international ‘other’ in an accepted resistance to yet another 
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foreign pressure. Resistance to sanctions imposed over support of Bosnian Serbs was a 
nationalizing effect in government propaganda. According to Babic and Jokic (2000): 
Far from facilitating change, sanctions fortify the status quo and lead to the de facto surrender 
of strict moral criteria. This is manifested in the population's readiness to acquiesce to much 
hardship over a prolonged period. These are conditions that they would not otherwise tolerate. 
As they absolve the regime of responsibility for its failures, the sanctioned adopt lower moral 
standards and exhibit general decline in moral consciousness (Babic and Jokic 2000, 93).  
 
The social component to state marginalization involves accepting what cannot change: namely 
international perception. This very concept may have been psychologically realized in Haiti and 
Iraq as well – despite lack of depth in the sanctions research. Sanctions discourage the populace 
from believing in an adequate place at the table, just as regional partnerships, particularly the 
European Union, were elevating members both politically and economically. While neighbors 
grew in strength, former Yugoslavia grew in disdain. 
 Instead, sanctions encouraged a lucrative emerging market of sanction busting from 
surrounding states. In the highly competitive European financial and export markets, countries 
savvy and willing to engage in prohibited distribution found potential profits too good to pass up. 
Peter Andreas (2005) considers,  
At the political level, the most important criminalizing effect of sanctions is that the targeted 
regime may go into the business of organized crime to generate revenue, secure supplies, and 
strengthen its hold on power, fostering an alliance with clandestine transnational economic 
actors for mutual gain. This alliance may, in turn, persist beyond the sanctions period. At the 
economic level, the most profound criminalizing result of sanctions can be to push economic 
activity underground and dramatically inflate the profitability of illicit commerce (Andreas 
2005, 336).  
 
Sanctions did not create criminal behavior – much of this proclivity was already there. But they 
helped fan the flames in a mix of patriotic resistance and good old fashioned profiteering. 
 Resistance is a social and cultural norm long established in Eastern Europe. Bootlegging 
of any banned substance can be found in even the most modern, progressive democracies. 
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Andreas (2005) concedes that sanctions do not necessarily create criminalized behavior, and not 
every regime under sanctions embraces illicit smuggling networks. However, even if busting 
sanctions is not officially promoted, economic sanctions provide strong incentives to engage in 
criminal networks and illicit trade: “The Milosevic regime’s sanctions-busting apparatus relied 
on a regional support structure utilizing immediate neighbors as transshipment points. Thus, even 
while not directly targeted by international sanctions, countries such as Albania, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Macedonia directly experienced their criminalizing effects” (Andreas 2005, 345).  
Governments under sanctions can use these networks to supplement income and reward 
supporters. And the willingness to embrace illegal activity trickles down to the populace these 
leaders serve. Sanctions leave a lasting imprint on society. As Andreas (2005, 337) notes: “At the 
societal level, the most significant criminalizing consequence of sanctions is the potential of 
fostering ‘uncivil society,’ reflected in a higher level of public tolerance for lawbreaking and an 
undermined respect for the rule of law. Smuggling may not only become perceived as ‘normal’ 
rather than deviant, but it may even be celebrated as patriotic.” Sanctions have ill effects on the 
respect for legality, both internationally and domestically. Andreas (2005) offers a criminalizing 
profile that matched the case study of Serbia and Montenegro (Former Yugoslav Republic), one 
that partially applied to the cases of Iraq and Croatia.  
Neighboring Albania also embraced illegal smuggling, reflected in the economic boom 
and bust during and after sanctions. Strengthening illicit economies appears to be a common side 
effect to sanctions. Albania’s economic boom was experienced when a network of sanctions 
evasion was created and its subsequent bust when the end of sanctions introduced lower prices 
and tougher competition among regional neighbors (Andreas 2005, 348). The duration of 
sanctions can assist criminal networks to engage in and strengthen above ground economic 
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channels. This was not the case for Albania, but may have involved key actors within former 
Yugoslavia that would be prime candidates for targeted economic sanctions. The ability to track 
trade engaged in below the surface and have a realistic view of the effects of sanctions 
determines their ultimate success or failure. 
Ultimately, Andreas (2005) found similarities and differences between Yugoslavia and 
Iraq. One similarity is imposed sanctions and civil unrest. Andreas (2005, 355) asserts: “The 
basic difference is that, for the FRY [Former Republic of Yugoslavia], an important part of the 
criminalized legacy of the sanctions has been the degree of institutionalization of the Milosevic-
era sanctions-busting networks. For Iraq, almost the opposite problem has emerged: a vacuum 
created by the apparent destruction of previously dominant institutions.” By eliminating 
institutions as a unifying feature, sanctions are isolated as the key variable causing distress. 
Though sanctions accomplished their intended goals, unintended consequences were 
encountered. Further study of the criminalizing consequences of sanction regimes is appropriate. 
North Korea: The Rogue Sovereign 
 The dark side of sovereignty is when a nation chooses to be marginalized. The politicized 
rhetoric of the Kim regime is fueled by the world turning its back on the ‘Hermit Kingdom.’ The 
Kim regime has long used its stigma as international rogue in state run propaganda and in 
attempts to fuel nationalist sentiment. Though recent attempts at goodwill diplomacy have 
occurred in the Olympics, the divided state of Korea does not seem any closer to unification. 
North Korea’s nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile testing program has shaken a fist at 
the world governing body. The entire world is interested to see if a proposed Trump-Kim 
meeting will take place and if the goal of nuclear nonproliferation will have any staying power. 
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 Still, positive trends are emerging, and some are attributing the change to the impact of 
sanctions. However, the change in North Korean regime behavior is still supported by the 
general consensus on sanctions. Sanctions must be multilateral. Until China fully embraced 
international efforts to isolate North Korea, the Kim regime did not truly feel the full effects of 
sanctions. Despite turning to Russia as a potential UN sanctions buster, the North Korean regime 
is truly at an economic disadvantage without China (Ramani 2018). A third of North Korean 
exports declined in 2017 thanks to Chinese support (Vaswani 2018). To some degree, the 
positive impact of sanctions is the revelation of economic strength without them. A combination 
of sanctions and diplomacy has forced the hand of the Kim regime to consider denuclearization, 
a missile test ban and even political reconciliation with South Korea. 
 It is genuinely concerning to note that North Korea has the most staying power of all 
rogue states. In the 1990s, the Security Council deemed Iran, Iraq and North Korea as rogues in 
the area of nuclear proliferation. Not much has changed, other than wars and sanctions that led to 
deposing leaders like Qaddafi and Hussein and the stabilization of the Iran nuclear deal, as 
discussed below. North Korea is an area that demands future sanctions research, particularly in 
light of recent events. But the continuing use of sanctions begs one very important question – 
must there be villains in order for liberal internationalism to succeed? 
Iranian Nuclear Deal – Did Sanctions Induce Change? 
 Iran is no stranger to the impact of extraterritorial coercion. From the deposition of the 
U.S. backed Shah in 1979 to the resisted influence of China and Russia, the Iranian revolutionary 
spirit and desire for self determination have a long and storied history. The Iranian Revolution 
and U.S. Embassy hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981 dramatically altered the balance of economic 
power in Iran. Prior to 1979, the United States had a commanding market share (Early 2015). 
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Losing a primary trading partner left the new regime susceptible to economic sanctions, even 
unilateral ones, imposed from that state. Due to this, the initial round of sanctions imposed by the 
Carter Administration succeeded in pressuring the release of the hostages. Although diplomacy 
had failed, military involvement was avoided and sanctions were touted as the catalyst for a 
desired change. However, the release of imprisoned Americans may have been a modest goal of 
sanctions as opposed to regime change. Modest goals are more likely to succeed through 
economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2011). 
 Sanctions imposed from 1981 to 2005 did not enjoy the same degree of success. The goal 
of eliminating terrorism and avoiding nuclear proliferation were less likely to achieve. Iran’s 
regional and religious interests precluded abandoning resistance groups like Hezbollah and 
Hamas, particularly in the politically charged confrontations with Israel and the United States in 
Lebanon. Perhaps a second Cold War was forming between Iran and the United States, 
culminating in almost four decades of economic sanctions. However, as goals changed, so did 
Iran’s ability to find alternate trade partners—notably across the Persian Gulf. 
 The United Arab Emirates provided a trade-based sanctions buster for Iran in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Oddly enough, former adversary Iraq also provided economic smuggling 
opportunities for Iran due to the political destabilization of the Persian Gulf War. After 9/11, the 
United States economic sanctions and military presence in Iraq greatly increased scrutiny, 
discouraging Iran from continuing to use its ports. However, despite a security pact between the 
governments of the United States and United Arab Emirates, the Free Trade Zones of Dubai and 
other emirates provided safe harbor for the Iranian demand for sanctioned goods. Surprisingly, 
the U.A.E. emerging as a sanctions-buster ran contrary to its security goals, particularly in 
regards to quelling Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
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 Compliance with UN sanctions includes some give and take. Turkey reduced their 
imports of Iranian oil and gas, but received a waiver from complete boycott due to energy 
security concerns (Katzman 2015, 707). Turkey’s position as a NATO ally of the United States 
perhaps helped leverage this exemption. Still, the complicated energy and trade relationships that 
exist among regional neighbors highlight the caution that must be put on any sanctions regime. 
Pressuring Iran to end its support of terrorist groups should not result in undermining a regional 
neighbor. The entire episode of sanctions leading to a nuclear deal is ripe for further research. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
 Economic sanctions are a familiar tool of international statecraft. The literature is critical 
of their use but falls short of recommending alternative options. War and military action are to be 
avoided at all costs. An accepted cost is the unintended consequences of economic sanctions that 
affect the populace of a rogue regime. Over time, sanction regimes have endeavored for 
multilateral cooperation and specific targeting. Corporations, industries, and elites are targeted in 
order to pressure those who directly support or benefit from international ‘bad actors.’  In order 
to achieve some sort of global general will, sanctions (or some form of coercive measure) must 
exist to promote norm compliance. 
 Regarding hegemonic theory, it is naïve to imagine economic or political reasoning 
existing independent of one another. In the case of the Soviet Union financially supporting Cuba, 
the political will to continue sanctions did not outlast economic viability. Similarly, economic 
incentives have political ramifications. In the case of Albania, a political motivation to develop 
its trade infrastructure could accompany the economic incentive. Seeing its neighbors mired in 
war – both civil and international – could offer a state the political motivation to strive to emerge 
into a regional power struggle. Emerging hegemons understand the need for economic market 
share in asserting regional influence. The United States, as the leading political and economic 
power, is able to employ economic sanctions as a coercive tool to influence state behavior 
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992, 16). Financial sanctions and trade restrictions affect a state’s 
ability to exercise power and influence in the global marketplace. 
 The use of economic sanctions is consistent with liberal internationalism. As unilateral 
efforts are discouraged, states turn to regional and international coalitions to assert norm 
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compliance. The desire for engagement in global trade establishes consent to the propagation of 
the general will. The continued reliance on sanctions in a world of growing economic 
interdependence establishes a system of consequences and missed opportunities for states that 
refuse norm compliance. The United Nations acts as a collective enforcer of that general will. 
Sanctions are employed under the authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. charter (Cortright and 
Lopez 1995, 20). Regional bodies, such as the European Union or the Organization of American 
States, can also take leading roles in assuring norm adherence. 
 Sanctions are constructivist. Just as regional and international organizations are 
constructed for a purpose, sanction regimes are constructed to further certain goals. The 
imposition of sanctions on one bad actor can also serve as a deterrent to other potential rogues 
considering behavior that would lead to economic losses. Sender states, by accepting costs to 
their own firms, prove the importance of international norms by bearing part of the burden. 
Sanctions may be critiqued as a sort of post-colonial authority, choosing the winners and losers 
in the global economy. However, as long as expectations are communicated fairly and openly 
through international channels, states should understand what behavior invites sanctions and be 
able to avoid such undesirable policies. 
 As the most common originator of economic sanctions, the United States may invite 
unfair classification as a global meddler. It is easy to find literature critical of U.S. foreign 
policy. Most endeavor for the United States to reduce its role as a hegemon in a multipolar 
world. Many cry for multi-polarity or collective hegemony through “democratic” international 
institutions, such as the United Nations. An accurate assessment of how democratic these 
institutions actually are, when power and influence is wielded in different amounts by different 
actors (for example: U.S. monetary support of the IMF and World Bank; Security Council veto 
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power over the UNGA) will be reserved to further study. However, it is worth noting that many 
studies focus on the overarching policy behind US foreign policy (meddling and ‘nation 
building’) and fewer critical analyses are given to the tools of that meddling. Dempsey and 
Fontaine (2001) examine many of the targeted theaters of U.S. foreign intervention mentioned in 
the cases above. These include Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. There does not seem to be a 
mentioned correlation between attempts at nation building and economic sanctions. Perhaps this 
focus represents a missing control variable from the research: do attempts at ‘nation-building’ 
undermine or support the likelihood of success of imposed economic sanctions? What can be 
gleaned from Dempsey and Fontaine’s work is that any political or economic meddling carries 
strict responsibility: “Nation building is perhaps the most intrusive form of foreign intervention. 
It is the massive foreign regulation of the policymaking of another country” (Dempsey and 
Fontaine 2001, 2). Nation building represents a form of economic and political imperialism and 
stands contrary to the American ideal of self-determination of nations—a principle supported 
within liberal internationalism.  
 Dempsey and Fontaine posit that the concept of nation building is linked to postcolonial 
modernization. In a New York Times profile, Clinton national security advisor Anthony Lake 
promoted ‘neo-Wilsonian’ foreign policy “in which the United States uses its military and 
economic power to intervene in promoting democracy” (Dempsey and Fontaine 2001, 6). But if 
a better way exists, it is so far absent in policy and research. Further, if the United States can be 
fairly assessed for colonial use of sanctions, what about the United Nations? Is the United 
Nations merely a colonial power exerting its will on smaller, poorer states? Or is this simply a 
complaint from those states unable to find a democratic coalition within a responsive 
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international community? Post-colonialism warrants a theoretical critique, but sanctions remain 
consistent with liberalism and constructivism. 
 Should the international community discourage the use of economic sanctions? Despite a 
one in three success rate, sanctions provide at worst a form of economic coercion and at best a 
form of signaling of the general will of nations. Christopher Joyner applauds sanctions as a 
catalyst for greater international cooperation: “States must work together to make sanctions work 
well. Members of the United Nations must exercise sufficient political will, national 
determination, and sometimes economic sacrifice to make international sanctions work” 
(Cortright and Lopez 1995, 85). Unilateral sanctions may not fully disappear in a world where 
nationalist far right movements give fuel to the assertion that international consent is 
unnecessary, but states may begin to see that international cooperation can assert shared goals. 
Mutual security and economic prosperity are supported by both sides of the political divide. 
Domestic firms may lose potential economic opportunities, but overall stability provides a better 
environment for future gains. 
 Constructed norms and institutions warrant examination. If economic coercion is not seen 
as a sin, then trade embargoes, blockades and media shaming can continue unpunished and 
uninhibited. Allies should not cause a fuss over newly crafted sanctions episodes, no matter the 
target or the methods. Saudi Arabia can effectively impose standards in Qatar without firing a 
single shot using the following methods: travel restrictions, airline ban, and a ban on local media. 
However, even targeted sanctions have concerns on proper implementation and effectiveness 
(Gordon 2011, 324). The concept of state sovereignty should permit states to impose trade 
restrictions on other states. Media pundits already envision a trade war based on Trump’s steel 
and aluminum tariffs. Can exercising one’s economic sovereignty with another state be outlawed 
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by the World Trade Organization to force consent with globalization of trade? Should states be 
allowed to ‘opt out’ of the global economic order? Forced compliance to trade is not the same as 
forced compliance to norms. 
 As for sanctions, a general policy recommendation is to consider all possible 
ramifications before engaging in sanctions. Humanitarian concerns, loss of market share, and a 
realistic assessment of changed behavior should all be considered. Sanction regimes are much 
more effective when used as positive rather than negative, carrot instead of stick (Hufbauer et al. 
2011, 169). Policy makers should exercise restraint in determining economic measures that 
might be popular domestically, yet impact a foreign populace and foreign credibility. Domestic 
firms should not have to move out of sender states simply to operate unhindered in the world 
economy. Sanctions are assumed to endure beyond American hegemony (Ikenberry 2011). 
Overall, sanctions provide a necessary feature of cooperative statecraft – the ability to signal or 
coerce other states into norm compliance. Economic sanctions play a vital role in establishing 
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